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作者：Dugar, Subhasish; Shahriar, Quazi
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; California State University System; San Diego State University
摘要：This paper is the first to compare the efficiency-enhancing capacity of two communication protocols in experimental stag-hunt games. The traditional restricted protocol that allows communicating intentions only fails to improve efficiency over the no-communication conditions. When players are allowed to send any messages (free-form), the majority of them send messages that underscore a reason for which players should choose the efficient action. To explore further whether the absence of such a...
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作者：Busetto, Francesca; Codognato, Giulio; Ghosal, Sayantan; Julien, Ludovic; Tonin, Simone
作者单位：University of Udine; University of Glasgow; Durham University
摘要：We show the existence of a Cournot Nash equilibrium for a mixed version of the Shapley window model, where large traders are represented as atoms and small traders are represented by an atomless part. Previous existence theorems for the Shapley window model, provided by Sahi and Yao (1989) in the case of economies with a finite number of traders and by Busetto et al. (2011) in the case of mixed exchange economies, are essentially based on the assumption that there are at least two atoms with s...
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作者：Lagziel, David; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：An investor has some funds invested through portfolio managers. By the end of the year, she reallocates the funds among these managers according to the managers' performance. While the investor tries to maximize her subjective utility (that depends on the total expected earnings), each portfolio manager tries to maximize the overall amount of funds bestowed in his hands to manage. A reward scheme is a rule that determines how funds should be allocated among the managers based on their performa...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Yenmez, M. Bumin
摘要：We provide several characterizations of q-responsive choice functions, based on classical axioms of matching theory and revealed preference theory. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Diasakos, Theodoros M.; Koufopoulos, Kostas
作者单位：University of Stirling; University of Leicester
摘要：This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We extend the three-stage game in Hellwig (1987) by allowing firms to endogenously choose whether or not to pre-commit on their contractual offers (menus). We show how this mechanism can deliver the Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence allocation as the unique perfect-Bayesian equilibrium. This allocation is the unique incentive-efficient and individually-rational maximizer of the utility of the m...
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作者：Fischer, Mira; Sliwka, Dirk
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：Previous research has shown that feedback about past performance has ambiguous effects on subsequent performance. We argue that feedback affects beliefs in different dimensions - namely beliefs about the level of human capital and beliefs about the ability to learn and this may explain some of the ambiguous effects. We experimentally study the causal effects of an exogenously administered change in beliefs in both of these dimensions on the motivation to learn. We find that confidence in the a...
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作者：Lindsay, Luke
作者单位：University of Exeter
摘要：This paper explores how the Shapley value can be used as the basis of a payment rule for auctions and exchanges. The standard Shapley value is modified so that losing bidders do not make or receive any payments. The new rule, called the balanced winner contribution (BWC) rule, satisfies a variation of Myerson's balanced contribution property. The payment rule is fair in the sense that, with respect to reported values, the members of every pair of traders make equal contributions to each other'...
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作者：Haruvy, Ernan; Li, Sherry Xin; McCabe, Kevin; Twieg, Peter
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; George Mason University
摘要：We design a public goods laboratory experiment in both a virtual world environment and an abstract computerized environment, each with and without communication and visibility, to investigate how communication and visibility of other participants affect individual contributions to public goods. In both environments, the presence of communication significantly and consistently improves public good contributions. However, the interaction between communication and visibility differs in the two en...
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作者：Bjorndahl, A.; Halpern, J. Y.; Pass, R.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Cornell University
摘要：We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a class of logics appropriate for reasoning about the rationality of players in games, and show that essentially the same axiomatization applies to a very wide class of decision rules. We also consider games in which players may be uncertain as to what decision rules their opponents are using, and define in this context a new solution concept, D-rationalizability. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Gradwohl, Ronen; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Northwestern University; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：Players have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
