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作者：Alvarez-Mozos, M.; Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G.
作者单位：University of Barcelona; Universidade de Santiago de Compostela; Universidade de Vigo
摘要：We address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017). On the one hand, we provide bounds for any efficient, symmetric, and monotonic power index. On the other hand, we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano (2008) to the class of games under study by adapting well-known properties. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Thompson, David R. M.; Leyton-Brown, Kevin
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：After experimentation with other designs, major search engines converged on weighted, generalized second-price auctions (wGSPs) for selling keyword advertisements. Theoretical analysis is still not able to settle the question of why they found this design preferable to other alternatives. We approach this question in a new way, adopting an analytical paradigm we dub computational mechanism analysis. Specifically, we sample position auction games from a given distribution, encode them in a comp...
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作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Patel, Amrish
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Gothenburg; University of Arizona; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars have argued that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical. Neither cost-sharing nor reciprocity in isolation can solve the problem, but together they have that potential. We introduce new network notions of reciprocity relations to better understand this. (C)...
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作者：Wright, James R.; Leyton-Brown, Kevin
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：It is commonly assumed that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies; however, experimental studies have demonstrated that this is often a poor description of human players' behavior in unrepeated normal-form games. We analyze five widely studied models of human behavior: Quantal Response Equilibrium, Level-k, Cognitive Hierarchy, QLk, and Noisy Introspection. We performed what we believe is the most comprehensive meta-analysis of these models, leveraging ten datasets from the literature ...
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作者：Arechar, Antonio A.; Dreber, Anna; Fudenberg, Drew; Rand, David G.
作者单位：Yale University; Stockholm School of Economics; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We let participants indicate their intended action in a repeated game experiment where actions are implemented with errors. Even though communication is cheap talk, we find that the majority of messages were honest (although the majority of participants lied at least occasionally). As a result, communication has a positive effect on cooperation when the payoff matrix makes the returns to cooperation high; when the payoff matrix gives a lower return to cooperation, communication reduces overall...
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作者：Perea, Andres; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Maastricht University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：For a given epsilon > 0, the concept of epsilon-proper rationalizability (Schuhmacher, 1999) is based on two assumptions: (1) every player is cautious, i.e., does not exclude any opponent's choice from consideration, and (2) every player satisfies the epsilon-proper trembling condition, i.e., the probability he assigns to an opponent's choice a is at most epsilon times the probability he assigns to b whenever he believes the opponent to prefer b to a. In this paper we show that a belief hierar...
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作者：Rosar, Frank
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：An agent who is imperfectly informed about his binary quality can voluntarily participate in a test that generates a public signal. I study the design of the test that allows for optimal learning of the agent's quality when the agent strives for a high perception of his quality but is averse towards perception risk. For a large class of reduced-form utility functions that reflect these properties, the optimal test is binary and not subject to false positives. I uncover the forces that drive th...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Ritzberger, Klaus
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：In finite games subgame perfect equilibria are precisely those that are obtained by a backwards induction procedure. In large extensive form games with perfect information this equivalence does not hold: Strategy combinations fulfilling the backwards induction criterion may not be subgame perfect in general. The full equivalence is restored only under additional (topological) assumptions. This equivalence is in the form of a one-shot deviation principle for large games, which requires lower se...
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作者：Tarbush, Bassel; Teytelboym, Alexander
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We present a dynamic model of social network formation in which a fixed number of agents interact in overlapping social groups. We derive several results on the formation of links in such networks, including results on the degree distribution, on comparative statics relating degree and group size, and on the dynamics of homophily. In particular, we derive comparative statics showing that degree is typically positively related to social group size but negatively related to the size of the overl...
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作者：Anderlini, Luca; Terlizzese, Daniele
作者单位：Georgetown University; European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
摘要：Trusting beliefs can be exploited. A trustful player who is cheated too often, should start trusting less, until her beliefs are correct. For this reason we model trust as an equilibrium phenomenon. Receivers of an offer to transact choose whether or not to cheat. Cheating entails a cost, with an idiosyncratic component and a socially determined one, decreasing with the mass of players who cheat. The model either has a unique equilibrium level of trust (the proportion of transactions not cheat...
