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作者：Lombardi, M.; Yoshihara, N.
作者单位：University of Glasgow; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; Hitotsubashi University; Kochi University Technology
摘要：This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. It models individual i's honesty standard as a profile of (possibly non-empty) collections of ordered pairs of outcomes, one for each member of society, over which individual i feels truth-telling concerns. Individual i is honest provided that she states her true preferences as well as rankings (not necessarily complete) of outcomes that are consistent with the true preferences of ind...
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作者：Lubensky, Dmitry; Schmidbauer, Eric
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida
摘要：In a veto game a biased expert recommends an action that an uninformed decision maker can accept or reject for an outside option. The arrangement is ubiquitous in political institutions, corporations, and consumer markets but has seen limited use in applications due to a poor understanding of the equilibrium set and an ensuing debate over selection. We develop a simple method to construct every veto equilibrium and identify the most informative equilibrium in a setting that spans prior work. W...
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作者：Derks, Jean
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We consider transferable utility games, where restricted cooperation is modeled by a fixed mapping assigning to each coalition the set of players that are controlled by this coalition. We study the Shapley value on the resulting class of restricted games, and provide axiomatic frameworks characterizing this value. Studies show that several classes of so-called conjunctive restrictions lead to frameworks similar to the original introduced by Shapley in 1953. We show that conjunctivity of the re...
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作者：Dur, Umut; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：Top Trading Cycles was originally developed as an elegant method for finding a competitive equilibrium of Shapley and Scarf's housing market. We extend the definition of a competitive equilibrium to the school assignment problem and show that there remains a profound relationship between Top Trading Cycles and a competitive equilibrium. Specifically, in every competitive equilibrium with weakly decreasing prices, the equilibrium assignment is unique and exactly corresponds to the Top Trading C...
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作者：Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper provides an annotated bibliography of Lloyd Shapley's contributions to matching theory, game theory in general, and other areas in mathematics. 2017 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Sawa, Ryoji; Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：University of Tsukuba; University of Oregon
摘要：This paper investigates the role of loss-aversion in affecting the long-run equilibria of stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We consider a finite population of loss-averse agents who are repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric two-player normal form game. When an agent revises her strategy, she compares the payoff from each strategy to a reference point. Under the resulting dynamics, called prospect dynamics, risk-dominance is no longer sufficient to guarantee stochastic stability i...
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作者：Balkenborg, Dieter
作者单位：University of Exeter
摘要：In a model of modal logic it is shown that the assumptions of rationality and intelligence of the players imply that only rationalizable strategies can be played. Nothing more can be inferred from these rules. Hereby the assumption of Intelligence expresses that whatever an outside observer can deduce about the play of the game can be inferred by the players themselves, provided they have the same information. In our framework the assumption of intelligence is simply the familiar inference rul...
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作者：Steg, Jan-Henrik
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：This paper provides a general characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria for strategic timing problems, where two firms have the (real) option to make an irreversible investment. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market structure. The analysis is based directly on the inherent economic structure of the model. In particular, determining equilibria with preemptive investment is reduced to solving a single class of constrained optimal stopping problems. Further tools are derived ...
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作者：Wenner, Lukas M.
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：I study experimental markets in which sellers interact with buyers who have biased beliefs about characteristics of the product sold. I examine whether such buyers can be exploited by sellers through the use of specifically designed pricing structures. Theoretically, I show that a necessary condition for exploitation is consumer naivet about their belief bias, otherwise they infer their biased beliefs from the sellers' actions. My main experimental result establishes that whether exploitation ...
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作者：Ambuehl, Sandro; Li, Shengwu
作者单位：University of Toronto; University Toronto Scarborough; University of Toronto; Harvard University
摘要：How do individuals value noisy information that guides economic decisions? In our laboratory experiment, we find that individuals underreact to increasing the informativeness of a signal, thus undervalue high-quality information, and that they disproportionately prefer information that may yield certainty. Both biases appear to be mainly due to non-standard belief updating. We find that individuals differ consistently in their responsiveness to information - the extent that their beliefs move ...
