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作者：Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Edinburgh
摘要：Two debaters address an audience by sequentially choosing their information strategies. We compare the setting where the second mover reveals additional information (constructive argumentation) with the setting where the second mover obfuscates the first mover's information (toxic argumentation). We reframe both settings as constrained optimization of the first mover. We show that when the preferences are zero-sum or risk-neutral, constructive debates reveal the state, while toxic debates are ...
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作者：Iossa, Elisabetta; Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie m.; Rey, Patrick
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Melbourne; Duke University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimal...
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作者：Lambrecht, Marco; Proto, Eugenio; Rustichini, Aldo; Sofianos, Andis
作者单位：Hanken School of Economics; Universitetet i Stavanger; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Glasgow; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Durham University
摘要：How does information about players' intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, , based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, , does not provide useful predictions. We experimentally show that, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, disclosure hampers cooperation: higher-intelligence players trust their partners less when playing against someone of lower ability. Similarly, , in the Battle of Sexes with low payoff inequality, , disclosure disrupts coordination, , as higher-intelli...
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作者：Wang, Tao; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Capital University of Economics & Business; Durham University
摘要：We show that a probability distribution likelihood ratio dominates another distribution if and only if, for every weighted utility function, the former is preferred over the latter. Likewise, a probability distribution hazard rate (or reverse hazard rate) dominates another distribution if and only if, the former is preferred by every optimistic (or pessimistic) decision maker. (JEL D11, D83)
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作者：He, Simin; Wu, Jiabin; Zhang, Hanzhe; Zhu, Xun
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Oregon; Michigan State University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We experimentally examine the Becker-Shapley-Shubik two-sided matching model. In the experiment, the aggregate outcomes of matching and surplus are affected by whether equal split is in the core and whether efficient matching is assortative; the canonical cooperative theory predicts no effect. In markets with an equal number of participants on both sides, individual payoffs cannot be explained by existing refinements of the core, but are consistent with our noncooperative model's predictions. ...
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作者：Kokovin, Sergey; Ozhegova, Alina; Sharapudinov, Shamil; Tarasov, Alexander; Ushchev, Philip
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：Our novel approach to modeling monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms and consumers involves spatial product differentiation, in either a geographical space or a space of characteristics. In addition to price, each firm chooses location in space. We formulate conditions for positive sorting-more-productive firms serve larger market segments and face tougher competition-and for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. To quantify the role of sorting, we calibrate the model using hair...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Rehbinder, Gustav arreskog
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Uppsala University
摘要：We use simulations of a simple learning model to predict cooperation rates in the experimental play of the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We suppose that learning and the game parameters only influence play in the initial round of each supergame, and that after these rounds, play depends only on the outcome of the previous round. We find that our model predicts out -of -sample cooperation at least as well as models with more parameters and harder -to -interpret machine learning algo...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten; Williams, Cole
作者单位：University of Vienna; Durham University
摘要：E -commerce has led to a surge in products being returned after purchase. We analyze product returns as resulting from a trade-off between the social waste of returns and the search efficiency gains of being able to inspect a product's value after purchase. We find whenever returns are efficient , the market generates too few returns, as the parties involved in the transaction do not internalize the welfare benefit of consumers continuing their search , generating profits for other firms. We a...
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作者：Apffelstaedt, Arno; Freundt, Jana
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which participants distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less likely to voluntarily comply with a rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magni...
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作者：Benson, David; Blattner, Samuel; Grundl, Serafin; Kim, You suk; Onishi, Ken
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：Antitrust often uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHI ) for merger screening and review. We argue that HHI-based antitrust policy using predefined markets in the banking industry misses anticompetitive effects that are predicted by the proximity of merging branch networks. Difference-in-differences estimates from thousands of mergers reveal that close-proximity bank acquisitions have harmful effects, , including branch closures, , even if they fall below the HHI threshold for enforcement. ...
