Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lambrecht, Marco; Proto, Eugenio; Rustichini, Aldo; Sofianos, Andis
• 署名单位: Hanken School of Economics; Universitetet i Stavanger; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Glasgow; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Durham University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220245
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 199-231
• 关键词: infinitely repeated games; equilibrium; BEHAVIOR; skills

摘要

How does information about players' intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, , based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, , does not provide useful predictions. We experimentally show that, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, disclosure hampers cooperation: higher-intelligence players trust their partners less when playing against someone of lower ability. Similarly, , in the Battle of Sexes with low payoff inequality, , disclosure disrupts coordination, , as higher-intelligence players try to force their most preferred outcome. Instead, , with higher payoff inequality, , behavior changes and higher-intelligence players concede. We analyze the reasons for these patterns of behavior. ( JEL C72, C73, C92, D83, D91)