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作者：Lipsitz, Michael; Tremblay, Mark j.
作者单位：Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE); University of Nevada Las Vegas
摘要：Employee spin-offs harm incumbent firms by increasing competition ( benefiting consumers) and preventing firm owners from making beneficial investments in workers who may later spin off ( harming consumers). We model noncompete agreements ( NCAs ) as solutions for the firm and analyze the resulting trade-off for consumers. We show that market structure and the nature of investment play large roles. Counterintuitively, increased investment benefits have the potential to harm consumers such that...
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作者：Wei, Dong; Green, Brett
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：A seller markets a good to a customer whose willingness to pay depends on his private type and the good's quality. The seller designs a screening mechanism that specifies both transfers and information revealed about quality. We show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a menu of price -experiment pairs, featuring both price discrimination and information discrimination: buyers with higher private types face lower prices and receive less discerning positive signals. Moreover, we de...
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作者：Angelucci, Charles; Cage, Julia; Sinkinson, Michael
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Yale University
摘要：Technological innovations like broadcast television and the internet challenge local newspapers' business model of bundling their local content with third-party content, such as wire national news. We examine how the entry of television affected newspapers and news diets in the United States. We construct a dataset of newspapers' economic performance and content choices from 1944 to 1964 and exploit quasi-random variation in the rollout of television to show its negative impact in the readersh...
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作者：Toyama, Yuta
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：This paper develops and estimates a dynamic structural model of emissions abatement, , investment, , and permit trading with banking under cap-and-trade regulation. The model accounts for forward-looking behavior and transaction costs in the permit market, , which determine the temporal and geographical distribution of emissions in equilibrium and, , thus, , the welfare implications of the regulation. The model is applied to the US Acid Rain Program to evaluate the role of regulatory designs. ...
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作者：Thaler, Michael
作者单位：University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust; University of London; University College London
摘要：Motivated reasoning posits that people distort how they process information in the direction of beliefs they find attractive. This paper creates a novel experimental design to identify motivated reasoning from Bayesian updating when people have preconceived beliefs. It analyzes how subjects assess the veracity of information sources that tell them the median of their belief distribution is too high or too low. Bayesians infer nothing about the source veracity , but motivated beliefs are evoked...
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作者：Agranov, Marina; Eraslan, Hulya; Tergiman, Chloe
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research; Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Osaka; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：In bargaining environments with stochastic future surplus, failing to delay agreement can be inefficient when the expected future surplus is sufficiently high. Theoretically, such inefficiencies never arise under unanimity rule but can arise under majority rule. Using a laboratory experiment, we find support for these predictions, both when the unanimity rule is predicted to be more efficient and when there should be no difference between the two rules. We also find large point prediction devi...
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作者：Barrios, John m.; Wollmann, Thomas g.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：Antitrust authorities search public documents to discover anticompetitive mergers. Thus, investor disclosures may alert them to deals that would otherwise go undetected, creating disincentives for managers to divulge certain transactions. We study this behavior in publicly traded US companies. First, we employ a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of mandatory disclosures. We find that releasing information to investors poses antitrust risk. Second, we introduce a method f...
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作者：Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Lausanne
摘要：We study secure survey designs in organizational settings where fear of retaliation makes it hard to elicit truth. Theory predicts that ( i ) randomized-response techniques offer no improvement because they are strategically equivalent to direct elicitation, ( ii ) exogenously distorting survey responses ( hard garbling) can improve information transmission, and ( iii ) the impact of survey design on reporting can be estimated in equilibrium. Laboratory experiments confirm that hard garbling o...
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作者：Laferriere, Vincent; Montez, Joao; Roux, Catherine; Thoni, Christian
作者单位：University of Lausanne; University of Lausanne; University of Basel
摘要：We study experimentally the effect of multigame contact on cooperation, with each subject playing a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Multigame contact is present if a subject plays both games with a single partner, and it is absent if each of the two games is played with a different partner. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, multigame contact does not increase overall cooperation rates. Nonetheless, multigame contact systematically affects behavior and outcomes, acti...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Magnani, Jacopo
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
摘要：In vertically differentiated matching markets with private information, agents face an acceptance curse: being accepted as a partner conveys bad news. We experimentally investigate whether individuals anticipate the acceptance curse in such an environment. We test the effect of an exogenous change in reservation values, making some types more selective and inducing significant changes in the posterior distribution of match qualities. Consistent with limited strategic sophistication, subjects d...
