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作者：Colo, Philippe
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：An expert, , who is only informed of the probability of possible states, , communicates with a decision-maker through cheap talk. The decision-maker considers different probability distributions over states as possible and is ambiguity averse. I show that all equilibria of the game are equivalent to partitional ones and that the most informative is interim dominant for the expert. Information transmission regarding probabilities that are bad news for the decision-maker is facilitated by ambigu...
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作者：Barron, Kai; Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：This study explores selection neglect in an experimental investment game where individuals can learn from others' outcomes. . Experiment 1 examines aggregate-level equilibrium behavior. . We fiind strong evidence of selection neglect and corroborate several comparative static predictions of Jehiel's ( 2018 ) model, , showing that the severity of the bias is aggravated by the sophistication of other individuals and moderated when information is more correlated across individuals. . Experiment 2...
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作者：Boyer, Pierre C.; Roberson, Brian; Esslinger, Christoph
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：How do electoral incentives influence the choice to experiment with a policy reform that generates uncertain future benefits? To answer this question, , we examine a two-period model of redistributive politics with uncertain policy outcomes involving a mixture of private and public benefits. . In equilibrium, , we find that the intertemporal trade-off between current policy costs and future benefits creates an incentive for politicians to use public debt to smooth spending across periods. . Th...
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作者：Watkins, Eddie
摘要：Consumer recycling generates new intermediate inputs. If some of the inputs are used to manufacture a substitute for the original product, , the primary seller faces an incentive to reduce current output and raise rivals' future costs. I find that firms in the US paper industry facing exposure to future competition from the recycled sector, , based on differences between product specific recycling technologies, , reduced output more than firms not exposed to the recycled sector as consumer rec...
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作者：Chopra, Felix; Falk, Armin; Graeber, Thomas
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Bonn; Harvard University
摘要：Most prosocial decisions involve intertemporal trade-offs. Yet , the timing of prosocial utility fiows is ambiguous and bypassed by most models of other-regarding preferences. We study the behavioral implications of the time structure of prosocial utility , leveraging a conceptual distinction between consequence-dated and choice-dated utility fiows. We conduct a high-stakes donation experiment that comprehensively characterizes discounting behavior in self-other tradeoffs and allows us to iden...
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作者：Amasino, Dianna R.; Pace, Davide D.; Van der Weele, Joel J.
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University; University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Munich; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：Attitudes toward fairness and redistribution differ along socioeconomic lines. To understand their formation, we conduct a large-scale experiment on attention to merit and luck and the effect of attention on fairness decisions. Randomly advantaged subjects pay less attention to information about true merit and retain more economic surplus, and this effect persists in subsequent impartial decisions. Attention also has a causal role: encouraging subjects to look at merit reduces the effect of an...
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作者：Cetemen, Doruk; Margaria, Chiara
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Boston University
摘要：We study the exit of duopolists from a stochastically declining market. Firms privately learn about the market conditions from observing the stochastic arrival of customers, while exit decisions are publicly observed. A larger firm is more likely to have customers and hence has better information about the market conditions. We provide sufficient conditions for either the smaller or the larger firm to be the first to exit in the unique equilibrium. Because of observational learning, exiting ma...
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作者：Rostek, Marzena; Yoon, Ji Hee
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：Advances in market -clearing technology for multiple assets and synthetic products present alternative ways to leverage complementarities and substitutabilites in asset payoffs. This paper compares their equilibrium and welfare effects. In competitive markets , either instrument can mimic the efficient design. When traders have price impact , however , synthetic products and market -clearing technology provide separate instruments for impacting markets' performance and can generate synergies o...
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作者：Fosgerau, Mogens; Monardo, Julien; De Palma, Andre
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Bristol; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We introduce the inverse product differentiation logit ( IPDL ) model, a micro-founded inverse market share model for differentiated products that captures market segmentation according to one or more characteristics. The IPDL model generalizes the nested logit model to allow richer substitution patterns, including complementarity in demand, and can be estimated by linear instrumental variable regression with market-level data. Furthermore, we provide Monte Carlo experiments comparing the IPDL...
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作者：Halac, Marina; Kremer, Ilan; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Yale University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Warwick; Lancaster University
摘要：A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, , each delivering a signal of joint performance. We show that unlike under partial implementation, , the principal always exhausts her monitoring capacity to optimally implement work as a unique outcome. Optimal monitoring teams are homogeneous between them: equally sized and with agent...
