Constructive versus Toxic Argumentation in Debatest

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220114
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 262-292
• 关键词: Cheap talk; information disclosure; asymmetric information; eliciting information; Bayesian persuasion; multiple referrals; legislative rules; COMMUNICATION

摘要

Two debaters address an audience by sequentially choosing their information strategies. We compare the setting where the second mover reveals additional information (constructive argumentation) with the setting where the second mover obfuscates the first mover's information (toxic argumentation). We reframe both settings as constrained optimization of the first mover. We show that when the preferences are zero-sum or risk-neutral, constructive debates reveal the state, while toxic debates are completely uninformative. Moreover, constructive debates reveal the state under the assumption on preferences that capture autocratic regimes, whereas toxic debates are completely uninformative under the assumption on preferences that capture democratic regimes.