Decentralized Matching with Transfers: Experimental and Noncooperative Analyses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Simin; Wu, Jiabin; Zhang, Hanzhe; Zhu, Xun
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Oregon; Michigan State University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230030
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 406-439
• 关键词: coalition-formation; Price controls; sex-ratios; marriage; MARKET; COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; equilibrium; INFORMATION; STABILITY

摘要

We experimentally examine the Becker-Shapley-Shubik two-sided matching model. In the experiment, the aggregate outcomes of matching and surplus are affected by whether equal split is in the core and whether efficient matching is assortative; the canonical cooperative theory predicts no effect. In markets with an equal number of participants on both sides, individual payoffs cannot be explained by existing refinements of the core, but are consistent with our noncooperative model's predictions. In markets with unequal numbers of participants, noncompetitive outcomes, are not captured by the canonical cooperative model, but are included in the set of predictions in our noncooperative model.