Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Apffelstaedt, Arno; Freundt, Jana
• 署名单位: University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200038
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 440-474
• 关键词: field experiment; strategy method; social norms; COOPERATION; authority; BEHAVIOR; IMPACT; FRAUD

摘要

Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which participants distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less likely to voluntarily comply with a rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magnitude as removing the election altogether and imposing a rule exogenously. Our experiment shows how corrupting democratic processes impacts economic behavior and sheds light on factors that may underlie rule legitimacy. ( JEL C90, D63, D72, D73, D83)