Coordination in the Fight against Collusions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iossa, Elisabetta; Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie m.; Rey, Patrick
• 署名单位: University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Melbourne; Duke University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220194
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 224-261
• 关键词: reserve prices; auctions

摘要

While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimally deter collusion when multiple independent buyers would not, consistent with the view that large buyers are less susceptible to collusion. (JEL D21, D43, D44, L12, L14)