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作者：Kranton, Rachel; Mcadams, David
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University
摘要：This paper investigates information quality in a simple model of socially connected information markets. Suppliers' payoffs derive from the fraction of consumers who see their stories. Consumers prefer to share and act only on high-quality information. Quality is endogenous and highest when social connectedness is neither too high nor too low. In highly connected markets, low-quality stories are widely seen, giving suppliers little incentive to invest in quality. Increasing the volume of misin...
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作者：Ershov, Daniel
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：In many online markets , consumers have to spend time and effort browsing through products. The addition of new products could make other products less visible , creating congestion externalities. Using Android app store data , I take advantage of a natural experiment-a redesign of part of the store-to show evidence of congestion externalities online: more apps in the market directly reduce per app usage / downloads. The natural experiment also increases long -run entry , but a structural dema...
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作者：Chen, Luming; Yi, Xuejie; Yu, Chuan
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Stanford University
摘要：This paper investigates the welfare effects of vertical integration in China's movie industry. We leverage data covering all theaters and 423 popular movies in China during 2014-2018. We find no evidence of integrated movies being foreclosed to rival theaters. Integrated theaters show movies for longer , allocate more screenings , and charge lower prices. We estimate a model of consumers' demand and theaters' screening decisions. Integrated theaters internalize a substantial fraction of their ...
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作者：Olivera, Rosina Rodriguez
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：A monopolist data seller offers information to privately informed data buyers. I characterize the seller's optimal menu, which screens between two types of buyers. Buyers' preferences for information allow the seller to extract all surplus, and the opti-mal menu's features are determined by the interaction between buyers' strategic incentives and the correlation of their pri-vate information. The seller offers perfect information to the buyer with the highest willingness to pay and partial inf...
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作者：Bridet, Luc; Schwardmann, Peter
作者单位：University of St Andrews; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We propose a model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers engage in self-deception to arrive at beliefs that optimally trade off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design shapes these benefits and costs. The model yields three key results. First, , the borrower's motivated cognition increases her material welfare, , which explains why it is not driven out of markets. Second, , in line with empi...
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作者：Guo, Liang
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We revisit the interpretation of the anchoring effect as evidence for nonexisting or arbitrary preferences. A theory of endogenous information acquisition ( i.e. , deliberation) is developed to rationalize the causal dependence of economic valuations on arbitrary anchor numbers. We identify theory-driven moderators to reconcile seemingly discrepant findings among original and follow-up anchoring experiments. We demonstrate in a meta-analysis that the anchoring effect may be systematically mode...
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作者：Calford, Evan M.; Cason, Timothy N.
作者单位：Australian National University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：Contributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events , others who are better at extracting i...
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作者：Sampson, Thomas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Global value chains create opportunities for North -South technology diffusion. This paper studies technology transfer in value chains when contracts are incomplete and input production technologies are imperfectly excludable. It introduces a new taxonomy of value chains based on whether the headquarters firm benefits from imitation of its supplier's technology. In inclusive value chains , where imitation is beneficial , the headquarters firm promotes technology diffusion. But in exclusive val...
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作者：Kibris, Ozgur; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Suleymanov, Elchin
作者单位：Sabanci University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We provide two nested models of random reference -dependent choice in which the reference point is endogenously determined by random processes. Random choice behavior is due to random reference points, even though, from the decision -maker's viewpoint, choices are deterministic. Through a revealed preference exercise, we establish when and how one can identify the reference -dependent preferences and the random reference rule from observed choice data. We also present behavioral postulates tha...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Fershtman, Daniel; Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; Emory University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We consider a decision-maker sequentially choosing among alternatives when periodic payoffs depend on both chosen and unchosen alternatives in that period. We show that when flow payoffs are the sum or product of payoffs from chosen and unchosen alternatives, the optimal policy is an index policy. We characterize key properties of the optimal dynamics and present an algorithm for computing the indices explicitly. Furthermore, we use the results to generalize Weitzman's ( 1979 ) classic Pandora...
