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作者：Cosaert, Sam; Verheyden, Bertrand; Theloudis, Alexandros
作者单位：University of Antwerp; Tilburg University
摘要：Spending time with a spouse is a major gain from marriage. We extend the classical collective model of the household to allow for togetherness between spouses. Togetherness takes the form of joint leisure and joint care for children. Using revealed preference conditions and Dutch data over the years 2009-2012, we find that households are willing to pay euro 1.20 per hour-10 percent of the average wage-to convert private leisure to joint leisure and euro 2.10 per hour to convert private childca...
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作者：Bagwell, Kyle; Lee, Seung Hoon
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yonsei University
摘要：We consider the single-sector version of the Melitz-Ottaviano model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. We characterize the first-best and market allocations. We find that the market provides the first-best level of entry but too little selection; hence, the market provides too many varieties and too little aggregate quantity, and allocates too little (much) production to low (high) cost realizations. Allowing for a broad family of quantity allocation functions, we establish ...
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作者：Kim, Jeongbin
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：This paper studies the effects of time preferences on cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game experiment. Subjects play repeated games in the lab, all decisions at once, but stage game payoffs are paid over an extended period of time. Changing the time window of stage game payoffs (weekly or monthly) varies discount factors, and a delay for the first-stage game payoffs eliminates/weakens present bias. First, subjects with weekly payments cooperate more than subjects with ...
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作者：Teh, Tat-How; Liu, Chunchun; Wright, Julian; Zhou, Junhe
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Tsinghua University
摘要：We provide a general framework to analyze competition between any number of symmetric two-sided transaction platforms, in which buyers and sellers can multihome. We show how key primitives such as the number of platforms, the fraction of buyers that find multihoming costly, the value of transactions, and the degree of user heterogeneity jointly determine the level and structure of platform fees. Even though platform entry always reduces the total fee level, whether it shifts the fee structure ...
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作者：Jungbauer, Thomas; Waldman, Michael
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. We investigate self-reporting when self-reports serve as a signal of sender productivity. In our model, a sender chooses an action and then sends a message concerning the action to multiple receivers. Receivers then bid for the sender's service after deciding whether to audit the sender. We find that self-reporting can reverse the standard result in signaling ...
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作者：Gamp, Tobias; Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Bonn
摘要：We study the implications of biased consumer beliefs for search market outcomes in the seminal framework due to Diamond (1971). Biased consumers base their search strategy on a belief function that specifies for any (true) distribution of utility offers in the market a possibly incorrect distribution of utility offers. If biased consumers overestimate the best offer in the market, a novel type of equilibrium may emerge in which firms make exceptionally favorable offers in order to meet biased ...
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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico; Nasr, Nikrooz
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Florence
摘要：We study mix-and-match compatibility choices of firms selling com-plementary products in a dynamic setting. Contrary to what hap-pens in a static setting where symmetric firms choose compatibility (Matutes and Regibeau 1988 ), when switching costs are high and firms make price discrimination based on past purchases, symmet-ric firms choose incompatibility to soften future competition if the discount factor is large, which harms consumers. Interoperability increases consumer surplus at least fo...
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作者：Merlino, Luca P.; Pin, Paolo; Tabasso, Nicole
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; University of Antwerp; University of Siena; Bocconi University; University of Surrey
摘要：We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Communication intensity in itself is irrelevant for relative rumor prevalence, and the effect of homophily depends on the exact verification process and equilibrium verification rates. Our model highlights that successful policies in the f...
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作者：Hodgson, Charles
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Manufacturers of durable goods can encourage consumers facing transaction costs to upgrade by accepting used units as trade-ins. These buyback schemes increase demand for new units, but increase the supply of used units if trade-ins are resold. I investigate the equilibrium effects of buyback schemes in the market for business jets. I find that buyback increases manufacturer revenue by 7.2 percent at fixed prices. However, in equilibrium this revenue gain is diminished by 43 percent due to sub...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Gary-Bobo, Robert J.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts' disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution. Experts bargain after disclosure of the dataset. Bargaining may lead to an inefficient use of information in a strong sense: experts receive a lower payoff in every state and for any prior belief (i.e., inadmissibility). Bargaining exhibits und...
