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作者：Li, Xuelin; Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Columbia University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study pivots as signaling devices in a dynamic experimentation model. An entrepreneur receives funding from an investor and has private information about a project, which requires costly experimentation to succeed. The entrepreneur has a real option to pivot, i.e., to abandon the project and to start a new one. Investors learn about the project from the arrival of exogenous information and from the entrepreneur's pivoting decisions. We characterize signaling equilibria in which high-skill e...
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作者：Ball, Ian
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The sender prefers higher decisions, and she can distort each feature at a privately known cost. I characterize the scoring rule that maximizes decision accuracy. This rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights other features so tha...
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作者：Reshidi, Pellumb; Thereze, Joao; Zhang, Mu
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Duke University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study asymptotic learning when the decision-maker faces ambiguity in the precision of her information sources. She aims to estimate a state and evaluates outcomes according to the worst-case scenario. Under prior-by-prior updating, we characterize the set of asymptotic posteriors the decision-maker entertains, which consists of a continuum of degenerate distributions over an interval. Moreover, her asymptotic estimate of the state is generically incorrect. We show that even a small amount o...
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作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper studies dynamic incentive pay in teams where agents' efforts are perfect substitutes. It shows that the principal may unequally reward identical agents to mitigate dynamic free riding in the form of procrastination. Unequal pay effectively creates a team leader who overworks and symmetric followers who underwork. Such leader-follower teams emerge if (i) agents are relatively patient or few, or (ii) the principal sufficiently cares about or is not patient for project success. These f...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Nunez, Matias
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We describe a sequential mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks agents to take turns in defining prices for each outcome, with a final player choosing an outcome for all: Price and Choose. The choice triggers a sequence of payments from each agent to the preceding agent. We present several extensions. First, payoff inequalities may be reduced by endogenizing the order of play. Second, our results extend to a...
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作者：Novak, Vladimir; Matveenko, Andrei; Ravaioli, Silvio
作者单位：National Bank of Slovakia; University of Mannheim; Cornerstone Research
摘要：We show that rational but inattentive agents can become polarized ex ante. We present how optimal information acquisition and subsequent belief formation depend crucially on the agent-specific status quo valuation. Beliefs can systematically-in expectations over all possible signal realizations conditional on the state of the world- update away from the realized truth, and even agents with the same initial beliefs might become polarized. We design a laboratory experiment to test the model's pr...
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作者：Ide, Enrique; Montero, Juan-Pablo
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：An increasing number of monopolization cases have been constructed around the notion of must-have items: products that distributors must carry to compete effectively. Motivated by these cases, , we consider a multiproduct setting where upstream suppliers sell their products through competing distributors offering one-stop-shopping convenience to consumers. We show the emergence of products that distributors cannot afford not to carry if their rivals do. A supplier of such products can exploit...
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作者：Exley, Christine L.; Kessler, Judd B.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Distributional decisions regularly involve multiple payoff components. In a series of experiments , we show that individuals sometimes exhibit narrow equity concerns: applying fairness preferences narrowly on a specific component of payoffs rather than on broader payoff consequences. This behavior results in different distributional decisions depending on which payoff component we frame individuals to consider. We document narrow equity concerns in an exceedingly simple setting -in which payof...
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作者：DE Corniere, Alexandre; Taylor, Greg
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Oxford
摘要：We study the profitability of bundling by an upstream firm that licenses technologies to downstream competitors and that faces competition for one of its technologies. In an otherwise standard Chicago -style model, the existence of downstream competition can make inefficient bundling profitable. Forcing downstream firms to use an inefficient technology reassures each one that it will face weak competition. This allows the upstream firm to extract more profit through its monopolized technology....
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作者：Sweeting, Andrew; Tao, Xuezhen; Yao, Xinlu
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We model repeated pricing by differentiated product firms when each firm has private information about its serially correlated marginal cost. In a fully separating equilibrium of the dynamic game , , signaling incentives can lead equilibrium prices to be significantly above those in a static , , complete information game , , even when the possible variation in the privately observed state variables is very limited. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry and show that , , with...
