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作者：Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multiplayer noisy contest in which a higher bid does not guarantee a sure win. The bid cap can be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright bidding restrictions on players' bids, while the latter taxes bids. A designer structures the bid cap to maximize a weighted sum between aggregate bid and tax revenue. Our analysis characterizes the optimum. A rigid bid is always outperformed by flexible ones, and a laissez- faire policy-i.e., no cap-is ...
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作者：Langtry, Alastair
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of London; King's College London
摘要：Keeping up with The Joneses matters. This paper examines a model of reference-dependent choice where reference points are determined by social comparisons. An increase in the strength of social comparisons, even by only a few agents, increases consumption and decreases welfare for everyone. Strikingly, a higher marginal cost of consumption can increase welfare. In a labor market, social comparisons with coworkers create a big fish in a small pond effect, inducing incomplete labor market sortin...
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作者：Sadler, Evan
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Firms and politicians, among others, invest heavily to influence people's opinions. Because peers influence one another, these efforts must account for social networks. Using a model of opinion dynamics with a non-degenerate steady state, I develop a new measure of influence, and I highlight how opinion fluctuations impact influence campaigns. If agents interact less frequently with those holding different opinions, the variance of public opinion decreases. Consequently, a risk-averse planner ...
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作者：Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents' information structure, requires (i) indi-vidual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the p...
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作者：Argenziano, Rossella; Gilboa, Itzhak
作者单位：University of Essex; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the gamx, y). In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous fo...
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作者：Cao, Dan; Lagunoff, Roger
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：We study a dynamic model of property appropriation in autocracies. To maintain the appearance of the rule of law, an autocrat reassigns property only when the reassignment is acceptable to all affected citizens. Nevertheless, the autocrat can appropriate public and private property by exploiting enforcement gaps. After an adjustment period, wealth shares of public property and the private property of out-groups decline. The model rationalizes the connection between wealth inequality and privat...
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作者：Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz
作者单位：University of Haifa; Reichman University
摘要：We study the implications of the disclosure regime of ratings on the level of information released to the public. Specifically, we compare mandatory and voluntary disclosure. We analyze a model where the potential issuers are initially endowed with homogeneous soft information about their values before paying to acquire ratings. We find that for every accuracy level of the issuers' initial information, voluntary disclosure results in a more informative equilibrium than mandatory disclosure. Th...
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作者：Duch-Brown, Nestor; Grzybowski, Lukasz; Romahn, Andre; Verboven, Frank
作者单位：IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; University of Cape Town; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; KU Leuven
摘要：We develop a framework to evaluate the impact of market integra-tion, accounting for spillovers between multiple distribution chan-nels. We adapt the standard random coefficients logit demand model to allow for substitution between channels and consumer arbitrage across countries. We apply our framework to the European por-table PC market, where geoblocking practices that restrict online cross-border trade have recently been banned. Consumers in high income countries gain most from price conve...
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作者：Quint, Daniel; Weretka, Marek
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We present a learning-based selection argument for Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Walrasian auction. Endowments vary stochastically; traders model residual supply as linear, estimate its slope from past trade data, and periodically update these estimates. In the standard setting with quadratic preferences, we show that this learning process converges to the unique LBN. Anonymity and statistical learning therefore support this commonly used equilibrium selection rule. (JEL D43, D44, D83)
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作者：Chen, Heng; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：Over the past decades the number of news outlets has increased dramatically, but the quality of news products has declined. We propose a model to reconcile these facts where consumers' attention allocation decisions not only depend on but also affect news outlets' quality choices. When competition is intensified by new entries, the informativeness of the news industry rises. Thus, attention is diverted from existing outlets, reducing their incentives to improve news quality, which begets a dow...
