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作者：Levin, Dan; Peck, James; Ivanov, Asen
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of London
摘要：Through a series of decision tasks involving colored cards, we provide separate measures of Bayesian updating and non-probabilistic reasoning skills. We apply these measures to (and are the first to study) a common-value Dutch auction. This format is more salient than the strategically equivalent first-price auction and silent Dutch formats in hinting that one should condition one's estimate of the value on having the highest bid. Both Bayesian updating skills and non-probabilistic reasoning s...
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作者：Fleurbaey, Marc; Mongin, Philippe
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：Harsanyi (1955) invested his Aggregation Theorem and Impartial Observer Theorem with utilitarian sense, but Sen (1986) described them as representation theorems with little ethical import. This critical view has never been subjected to full analytical scrutiny. The formal argument we provide here supports the utilitarian relevance of the Aggregation Theorem. Following a hint made by Sen himself, we posit an exogeneous utilitarian ordering that evaluates riskless options by the sum of individua...
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作者：Bernhofen, Daniel M.; Brown, John C.
作者单位：American University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Clark University
摘要：We exploit Japan's mid-nineteenth century transition from autarky to open trade to test Alan Deardorff's (1982) seminal and parsimonious autarky price formulation of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. Factor price data from Japan's late autarky period impose a refutable restriction on Japan's factor content of trade. Our data are constructed from many historical sources, including a major Japanese survey of agricultural techniques and a rich set of nineteenth century comparative cost studies. Evalua...
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Calvano, Emilio; Reisinger, Markus
作者单位：Duke University; University of Bologna; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
摘要：In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new model that allows consumers to choose multiple outlets and use it to study the effects on advertising levels and the impact of entry and mergers. We identify novel forces which reflect outlets' incentives to control the composition of their customer base. We li...
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作者：Conley, Timothy G.; Decarolis, Francesco
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); Boston University
摘要：We study entry and bidding in procurement auctions where contracts are awarded to the bid closest to a trimmed average bid. These auctions, common in public procurement, create incentives to coordinate bids to manipulate the bid distribution. We present statistical tests to detect coordinated entry and bidding choices. The tests perform well in a validation dataset where a court case makes coordination observable. We use the tests to detect coordination in a larger dataset where it is suspecte...
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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Nasr, Nikrooz
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper studies how news aggregators affect the quality choices of newspapers competing on the Internet. To provide a micro foundation for the role of the aggregator, we build a model of multiple issues where newspapers choose their quality on each issue. Our model captures well the main trade-off between the business stealing effect and the readership-expansion effect. We find that the aggregator increases the quality only if the readership-expansion effect is large enough relative to the ...
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作者：Stefanadis, Christodoulos
作者单位：University of Piraeus
摘要：The analysis shows that the volatility of a potential entrant's innovation is an important parameter that shapes an incumbent supplier's exclusivity strategy. Higher volatility encourages the incumbent supplier to adopt an accommodation strategy rather than a pure exclusion strategy. When volatility is above a threshold, the incumbent always chooses accommodation regardless of the expected size of the entrant's innovation. And since an accommodation strategy merely redistributes surplus withou...
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作者：Bidner, Chris; Roger, Guillaume; Moses, Jessica
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; University of Sydney; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited
摘要：We demonstrate how search frictions have important yet subtle implications for participation in a skilled labor market by studying a model in which agents invest in skill prior to searching for coworkers. Search frictions induce the existence of acceptance-constrained equilibria, whereby matching concerns-as opposed to investment costs-dissuade the marginal agent from investing and participating in the skilled matching market. Such equilibria are robust, relevant, and have comparative static p...
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Kos, Nenad; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：Boston College; Bocconi University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We consider the problem of selling a firm to a single buyer. The buyer privately knows post-sale cash flows and the benefits of control. Unlike the case where buyer's private information is one-dimensional, the optimal mechanism is a menu of tuples of cash-equity mixtures. When the seller wants to screen finely with respect to the private benefits, he makes an offer for the smallest fraction of the company that facilitates the transfer of control. When he wants to screen finely with respect to...
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作者：Che, Xiaogang; Klumpp, Tilman
作者单位：Durham University; University of Alberta
摘要：We examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entry. We show that delayed revelation equilibria exist in which some buyers place coordinated low early bids. These buyers revise their bids to reflect their true valuations just prior to the end of the auction. Compared to the benchmark immediate revelation equilibrium, in which buyers bid their valuations immediately after entry, fewer high-value bidders enter on expectation in the delayed revela...
