-
作者：Bar-Gill, Oren; Persico, Nicola
作者单位：Harvard University; Northwestern University
摘要：We show that efficient exchange obtains independently of the degree to which a legal system protects the rights of owners. We study a number of different legal rules, including property rules (strong protection), liability rules (any party can take the owner's asset but must pay a legally determined compensation), and even rules that protect the owner's interests very weakly (liability rules with a very low compensation level). Efficiency is obtained as long as the degree of protection provide...
-
作者：Guetlein, Marie-Charlotte
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：This paper suggests a characterization of increases in risk aversion within the smooth ambiguity model by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). I show that an increase in risk aversion is qualitatively different from that under expected utility, due to the incomplete separation between risk and ambiguity attitude. The analysis clarifies how ambiguity perception and attitude depend on risk aversion.
-
作者：Krishna, Kala; Tarasov, Alexander
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; National Bureau of Economic Research; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working in favor of them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the United States), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of ...
-
作者：Boik, Andre
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Local television stations are platforms in a two-sided market connecting advertisers and viewers. This paper explicitly examines the effect that important intermediaries (such as cable, telephone, and satellite distributors) may have on a platform's pricing behavior in a two-sided market. I find that stations raise their fees to cable distributors because stations prefer that viewers access their content through satellite distributors with whom they do not compete in the local advertising mark...
-
作者：Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We consider a seller's ability to deter potential entrants by offering exclusive contracts to downstream buyers. Previous literature has shown that this can be a profitable strategy if there is a coordination failure on the part of the buyers or if the seller can make discriminatory divide-and-conquer offers. This literature assumes that all offers are public. We show that if buyers cannot observe each other's offers and have passive or wary out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the divide-and-conquer e...
-
作者：Aghion, Philippe; Jackson, Matthew O.
作者单位：Harvard University; Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：How can a principal (employer or voter) induce an agent (worker or politician) to choose the right actions if risky actions reveal the agent's decision-making competence and only dismissal can be used as an incentive instrument? We first show that if the principal can commit to a replacement strategy, then optimal mechanisms involve either (i) a probationary period and then indefinite tenure, or (ii) dismissing poorly performing agents but also randomly replacing agents who take nonrevealing a...
-
作者：Chakraborty, Archishman; Ghosh, Parikshit
作者单位：Yeshiva University; University of Delhi; Delhi School of Economics
摘要：When an elite-controlled media strategically endorses candidates in order to promote its own ideological agenda, office-seeking parties may completely pander to the media, under moderate ideological conflict between voters and the elite. Larger ideological conflict leads to polarization-parties either become media darlings or run populist campaigns. The welfare effects are: (i) delegation by the media owner to a more moderate editor is Pareto improving, (ii) the median voter is never better of...
-
作者：Argenziano, Rossella; Severinov, Sergei; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Essex; University of British Columbia; University of Warwick
摘要：This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic communication setting. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert's advice may be more precise than when information is directly acquired by the decision maker, even if the expert is not more efficient than the decision maker at acquiring information. This result bears important implications for organization design. Communication by an expert to a decision maker may often outperform delegatio...
-
作者：Boutin, Aleksandra
摘要：Patent pools reduce prices when selling complementary inputs to technologies, but can also effectively cartelize markets when involving substitutes. Independent licensing, by reintroducing competition, ensures that only good pools form when there are two patent holders involved. For larger pools, independent licensing needs to be complemented by other policy tools. We propose to constrain the royalties for the patents individually licensed outside the pool with price caps replicating the pool'...
-
作者：Kagel, John H.; McGee, Peter
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results from the psychology literature. This quickly gives way to teams cooperating more than individuals. Team dialogues show increased payoffs from cooperation, along with anticipating opponents' recognition of the same, provides the basis for cooperation, even while fully anticipating defection near the end game. A strong status quo bias in defecting acro...
