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作者：Levy, Matthew; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper analyzes a labor market, where: workers can acquire an observable skill at no cost, firms differ in unobserved productivity, workers' skill and firms' productivity are substitutes, and firms' search is directed. The main result is that, if the entry cost of firms is small, no worker acquires the skill in the unique equilibrium. For intermediate entry costs, a positive measure of workers obtain the skill, and the number of skilled workers goes to one as entry costs become large. Welf...
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作者：Henry, Emeric; Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：Keeping valuable secrets requires costly protection efforts. Breaking them requires costly search efforts. In a dynamic model in which the value of the secret decreases with the number of those holding it, we examine the secret holders' protection decisions and the secret breakers' timing of entry, showing that the original secret holder's payoff can be very high, even when protection appears weak, with implications for innovators' profits from unpatented innovations. We show that the path of ...
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作者：Cosar, A. Kerem; Fajgelbaum, Pablo D.
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We introduce an internal geography to the canonical model of international trade driven by comparative advantages to study the regional effects of external economic integration. The model features a dual-economy structure, in which locations near international gates specialize in export-oriented sectors while more distant locations do not trade with the rest of the world. The theory rationalizes patterns of specialization, employment, and relative incomes observed in developing countries that ...
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作者：Frankel, Alex
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：This paper shows how to extend the heuristic of capping an agent against her bias to delegation problems over multiple decisions. Caps may be exactly optimal when the agent has constant biases, in which case a cap corresponds to a ceiling on the weighted average of actions. More generally caps give approximately first-best payoffs when there are many independent decisions. The shape of the cap translates into economic intuition on how to let an agent trade off increases on one action for decre...
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作者：Lacetera, Nicola; Larsen, Bradley J.; Pope, Devin G.; Sydnor, Justin R.
作者单位：University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; University of Chicago; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Auction design has been studied extensively; however, within a given design, does the process of how an auction is conducted matter as well? We address this question by looking for heterogeneity in the performance of auctioneers in English auctions. We analyze over 850,000 wholesale used car auctions and find significant differences across auctioneers in outcomes for otherwise similar cars. The performance heterogeneities are stable across time and correlate with subjective evaluations by the ...
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作者：Mueller-Frank, Manuel; Pai, Mallesh M.
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study a sequential social learning model where agents privately acquire information by costly search. Search costs of agents are private, and are independently and identically distributed. We show that asymptotic learning occurs if and only if search costs are not bounded away from zero. We explicitly characterize equilibria for the case of two actions, and show that the probability of late moving agents taking the suboptimal action vanishes at a linear rate. Social welfare converges to the...
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作者：Salant, Yuval; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study the efficient allocation of a divisible asset when reallocation is costly. Two players initially divide an asset between them. At the time of this initial division the players' valuations for the asset are uncertain. After the uncertainty resolves, costly reallocation may take place. We first establish that the surplus associated with efficient reallocation monotonically increases or decreases in the concentration of the initial division for a wide range of cost specifications. We the...
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作者：Spearot, Alan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：I derive a novel solution for the general equilibrium effects of tariffs that is robust to heterogeneity across industries and countries, and is a function of only aggregate trade data and country-by-industry Pareto shape parameters. Using the model to evaluate tariff shocks, I show that while most countries lose by removing observed tariffs unilaterally, India, Japan, Korea, and the United States gain by doing so, which suggests inefficient tariff discrimination. In evaluating multilateral sh...
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作者：Chen, Heng; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Crises, such as revolutions and currency attacks, rarely occur; but when they do they typically arrive in waves. The rarity of crises is an important contagion mechanism in a multiple-country dynamic global game model. When players are uncertain about the true model of the world, observing a rare success elsewhere can substantially change their expectations concerning the payoffs from attacking or defending the regime. Such dramatic revisions in beliefs, amplified by strategic complementarity ...
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作者：Cvitanic, Jaksa; Georgiadis, George
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We analyze a game in which a group of agents exerts costly effort over time to make progress on a project. The project is completed once the cumulative effort reaches a prespecified threshold, at which point it generates a lump-sum payoff. We characterize a budget-balanced mechanism that induces each agent to exert the first-best effort level as the outcome of a Markov perfect equilibrium, thus eliminating the free-rider problem. We also show how our mechanism can be adapted to other dynamic g...
