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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Boston College
摘要：We study path-independent choice rules applied to a matching context. We use a classic representation of these choice rules to introduce a powerful technique for matching theory. Using this technique, we provide a deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and study its properties. Next, we obtain a compelling comparative static result: if one agent's choice expands, the remaining agents on her side of the market are made worse off, while agents on the other...
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作者：Beshkar, Mostafa; Bond, Eric W.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We propose a model of flexible trade agreements in which verifying the prevailing contingencies is possible but costly. Two types of flexibility emerge: contingent protection, which requires governments to verify the state of the world, and discretionary protection, which allows governments to set tariffs unilaterally. The structure of the GATT/WTO agreement provides these two types of flexibility through a mechanism that we call Cap and Escape. Governments may choose tariffs unilaterally belo...
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作者：Deb, Rahul; Pai, Mallesh M.
作者单位：University of Toronto; Rice University
摘要：Discrimination (for instance, along the lines of race or gender) is often prohibited in auctions. This is legally enforced by preventing the seller from explicitly biasing the rules in favor of bidders from certain groups (for example, by subsidizing their bids). In this paper, we study the efficacy of this policy in the context of a single object: independent private value setting with heterogeneous bidders. We show that restricting the seller to using an anonymous, sealed bid auction format ...
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作者：Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Johansen, Bjorn Olav
作者单位：University of Bergen
摘要：We analyze a setting where a monopolist sells through retailers that set prices and provide valuable but non-contractible services to customers. We assume that contracts are private. We find that purely bilateral price restraints have no effect on the equilibrium outcome and that the standard Bertrand prices and service levels prevail. We also show that if manufacturers can commit to industry-wide resale prices, they can obtain higher prices and service levels but will generally not be able to...
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作者：Nayeem, Omar A.
摘要：This paper explores the useful but delicate role of managerial skepticism in hierarchical knowledge-based organizations. In these settings, the decision-maker principal seeks advice from managers, who instruct expert frontline workers to acquire information. Given unverifiable information quality and private-valued agents, moral hazard and adverse selection arise with workers and managers, respectively. Pairing extremely passionate workers with moderately skeptical managers alleviates both pro...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko
作者单位：Michigan State University; Yonsei University; University of Queensland
摘要：This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents, which makes it impractical to develop new products that avoid inadvertent infringement. We show that patent peace arises if product market competition is weak and patent portfolios are either sufficiently weak or sufficiently strong with comparable size. An increase in one firm's patent portfolio reduces the innovation incentives of its rivals but does not necessarily increase its...
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作者：Kotowski, Maciej H.; Zeckhauser, Richard J.
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Consumer search serves productive roles in an economy with multiple goods. In equilibrium, search promotes the sorting of consumers among producers, thereby enabling the market for new goods, and potentially increasing welfare and profits above the benchmark case (an economy with a single good, hence, no search). When competitors are few, additional direct competitors may benefit a firm, as more sellers may encourage more consumers to search. In return, consumer search entices producers of new...
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作者：Ashworth, Scott; de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability (i.e., providing incentives for politicians to take costly effort) and electoral selection (i.e., retaining politicians with characteristics voters value). We show that there may be a trade-off between these two channels. Higher levels of effective accountability may hinder the voters' ability to learn about the politicians. In turn, this may hinder electoral selection and be detrimental to voter welf...
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作者：Monzon, Ignacio
作者单位：Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：A continuum of homogeneous rational agents choose between two competing technologies. Agents observe a private signal and sample others' previous choices. Signals have an aggregate component of uncertainty, so aggregate behavior does not necessarily reflect the true state of nature. Nonetheless, agents still find others' choices informative, and base their decisions partly on others' behavior. Consequently, bad choices can be perpetuated: aggregate uncertainty makes agents herd on the inferior...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc; Li, Fei
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We study the role of dropout risk in dynamic signaling. A seller privately knows the quality of an indivisible good and decides when to trade. In each period, he may draw a dropout shock that forces him to trade immediately. To avoid costly delay, the seller with a low-quality good voluntarily pools with early dropouts, implying that the expected quality of the good increases over time. We characterize the time-varying equilibrium trading dynamics. It is demonstrated that the maximum equilibri...
