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作者：Kadan, Ohad; Liu, Fang; Liu, Suying
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Cornell University
摘要：We generalize the concept of systematic risk to a broad class of risk measures potentially accounting for high distribution moments, downside risk, rare disasters, as well as other risk attributes. We offer two different approaches. First is an equilibrium framework generalizing the Capital Asset Pricing Model, two-fund separation, and the security market line. Second is an axiomatic approach resulting in a systematic risk measure as the unique solution to a risk allocation problem. Both appro...
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作者：Holt, Charles A.; Smith, Angela M.
作者单位：University of Virginia; James Madison University
摘要：This paper uses a Bayesian information processing task to compare belief elicitation mechanisms including a quadratic scoring rule, a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak pricing procedure, and a two-stage menu of lottery choices that is structured to identify a precise point of probability indifference. The choice menu yields a higher incidence of correct Bayesian responses and lower belief error averages. Unlike the quadratic scoring rule, the binary payoffs for the lottery choice mechanism are synchroni...
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作者：Danan, Eric; Gajdos, Thibault; Tallon, Jean-Marc
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We provide a generalization of Harsanyi's (1955) aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto indifference, social preferences are represented through a set of aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a refinemen...
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作者：Elliott, Matthew
作者单位：University of Cambridge; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In many markets, relationship specific investments are necessary for trade. These formed relationships constitute a networked market in which not all buyers can trade with all sellers. We show that networked markets can be decomposed to identify how alternative trading opportunities affect who trades with whom and at what price. This uncovers agents' incentives to invest in relationships. Investment inefficiencies can eliminate all the gains from trade, but for reasons that differ depending on...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro
作者单位：Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We propose a model of data provision and data pricing. A single data provider controls a large database that contains information about the match value between individual consumers and individual firms (advertisers). Advertisers seek to tailor their spending to the individual match value. The data provider prices queries about individual consumers' characteristics (cookies). We determine the equilibrium data acquisition and pricing policies. Advertisers choose positive and/or negative targetin...
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作者：Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); European University Institute; University of Palermo; Universidad de San Andres Argentina; Centro Nacional Patagonico (CENPAT); Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impat...
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作者：Alonso, Ricardo; Dessein, Wouter; Matouschek, Niko
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Columbia University; Northwestern University
摘要：We examine the relationship between the organization of a multi-divisional firm and its ability to adapt production decisions to changes in the environment. We show that even if lower-level managers have superior information about local conditions, and incentive conflicts are negligible, a centralized organization can be better at adapting to local information than a decentralized one. As a result, and in contrast to what is commonly argued, an increase in product market competition that makes...
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作者：Limao, Nuno; Maggi, Giovanni
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We explore conditions under which trade agreements can provide gains by reducing trade policy uncertainty. Given the degree of income risk aversion, this is more likely when economies are more open, export supply elasticities are lower, and economies more specialized. Governments have stronger incentives to sign trade agreements when the trading environment is more uncertain. As exogenous trade costs decline, the gains from reducing tariff uncertainty become more important relative to reducing...
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作者：Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：We examine centralized versus decentralized decision making when experience of agents is private information and communication is necessary to learn from others. An agent has reputational concerns and his market may or may not observe what the other agent chooses (global versus local markets). With decentralized decision making, agents' willingness to communicate depends heavily on what a market observes. Strikingly, less communication may improve welfare. If markets are global, centralization...
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作者：Celik, Levent; Karabay, Bilgehan; McLaren, John
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT); University of Virginia
摘要：With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority to the president by committing not to amend a trade agreement. Why would it cede such power? We suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. In our model: (i) FTA is never granted if an industry operates in the majority of districts; (ii) The more symmetric the industrial pattern, the more likely is FTA, since competition fo...
