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作者：Bergstrom, Ted
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：This paper studies a version of the Volunteer's Dilemma in which players sequentially observe someone in trouble and decide whether to help. Where preferences are identical, we show that if the frequency with which potential helpers appear is above some threshold, then as frequency of appearance increases, the probability that any individual stops diminishes, but the expected waiting time for help to appear is constant. Where costs of stopping differ among individuals, as the frequency of appe...
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作者：Hellmann, Thomas; Thiele, Veikko
作者单位：University of Oxford; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We develop a new theory of the dynamic boundary of the firm where asset owners may want to change partners ex post. We identify a fundamental trade-off between (i) a displacement externality under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though his benefit is worth less than the loss to the displaced partner, and (ii) a retention externality under integration, where a partner inefficiently retains the other. With more asset specificity, displacement externalities matter more...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We introduce a solution concept in the context of large elections with private information by embedding a model of boundedly rational voters into an otherwise standard equilibrium setting. A retrospective voting equilibrium (RVE) formalizes the idea that voters evaluate alternatives based on past performance. Since counterfactual outcomes are not observed, the sample from which voters learn is potentially biased, leading to systematically biased beliefs in equilibrium. We provide an explicit l...
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作者：Bond, Eric W.; Saggi, Kamal
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We analyze bargaining between a developing country (South) and a multinational firm over the local price of its patented product. We use an alternating offers bargaining game in which the South can resort to compulsory licensing (CL) if the two parties fail to reach agreement by a certain deadline. The presence of international price spillovers introduces two novel features into the standard bargaining problem: the surplus from entry prior to the CL deadline may be negative, and CL can yield h...
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作者：Sautmann, Anja
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper considers a matching market with two-sided search and transferable utility where match payoffs depend on age at marriage (time until match) and search is finite. We define and prove existence of equilibrium, and provide sufficient conditions for positive assortative matching that build on restricting the slope and curvature of the marriage payoff function to generate single-peaked preferences in age and therefore convex matching sets. Payoff functions that are incompatible with posi...
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作者：Weyl, E. Glen; Veiga, Andre
作者单位：Yale University; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：To mitigate adverse selection in insurance markets, individuals are often mandated to buy at least a baseline plan, but may choose to opt into a premium plan. In some markets, such as US health exchanges, each plan is responsible for the full expenses of those who buy it ( total pricing). In other markets, such as the privately supplied Medigap top-ups to traditional government-provided Medicare, premium providers are only responsible for the incremental expenses they top up ( incremental pric...
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作者：Goto, Masahiro; Kojima, Fuhito; Kurata, Ryoji; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto
作者单位：Kyushu University; Stanford University; Keio University
摘要：To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i. e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mecha...
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作者：Kawakami, Kei
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：We analyze the welfare implications of information aggregation in a trading model where traders have both idiosyncratic endowment risk and asymmetric information about security payoffs. The optimal market size balances two forces: (i) the risk-sharing role of markets, which creates a positive externality amongst traders, against (ii) the information-aggregation role of prices, which leads to prices that are more correlated with security payoffs, thereby undermining the hedging function of mark...
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作者：Garcia, Daniel; Honda, Jun; Janssen, Maarten
作者单位：University of Vienna; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We study vertical relations in markets with consumer and retailer search. We obtain three important new results. First, we provide a novel explanation for price dispersion that does not depend on some form of heterogeneity among consumers. Price dispersion takes on the form of a bimodal distribution. Second, under competitive conditions (many retailers or small consumer search cost), social welfare is significantly smaller than in the double marginalization outcome. Manufacturers' regular pric...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：Columbia University; University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper examines how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects the disclosure of evidence and the outcome of adjudication, and how the adjudicator should allocate the burden of proof in light of these effects. Despite lawyers' expertise in assessing the evidence, their advice is found to have no effect on adjudication if the lawyers follow the strategies of disclosing all favorable evidence. A lawyer's advice can influence the outcome in his client's favor, either if (s) he c...
