Naked Exclusion and the Volatility of Innovation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stefanadis, Christodoulos
• 署名单位: University of Piraeus
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150072
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 39-50
• 关键词: Contracts; buyers; entry

摘要

The analysis shows that the volatility of a potential entrant's innovation is an important parameter that shapes an incumbent supplier's exclusivity strategy. Higher volatility encourages the incumbent supplier to adopt an accommodation strategy rather than a pure exclusion strategy. When volatility is above a threshold, the incumbent always chooses accommodation regardless of the expected size of the entrant's innovation. And since an accommodation strategy merely redistributes surplus without blocking efficient entry, it may not warrant a prohibition of exclusivity contracts by the antitrust authorities.