-
作者：Bobtcheff, Catherine; Levy, Raphael
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We consider a cash-constrained firm learning on the value of an irreversible project at a privately known speed. Under perfect information, the optimal date of investment may be non-monotonic in the learning speed: better learning increases the value of experimenting further, but also the speed of updating. Under asymmetric information, the firm uses its investment timing to signal confidence in the project and raise cheaper capital from uninformed investors, which may generate timing distorti...
-
作者：Lima, Rafael Costa; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry
作者单位：Universidade Federal de Pernambuco; Getulio Vargas Foundation; Paris School of Economics; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro
摘要：We address the trade- off between centralized and decentralized decision making subject to influence from privately informed lobbies. We focus on informative equilibria with separating differentiable contribution schedules and identify an information transmission effect under centralized structures. Such effect decreases capture and increases welfare when lobbies have aligned preferences. The opposite effect holds for polarized preferences. We present two examples of this framework: local publ...
-
作者：Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Rice University
摘要：A party in power can address a limited number of issues. What issues to address-the party's agenda-has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent addresses one issue among many and the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We show that no strategic manipulation arises without checks and balances and identify strategic manipulations in the forms of waiting for the moment, seizing the moment, steering, a...
-
作者：Staiger, Robert W.; Sykes, Alan O.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The non-violation clause of GATT is Exhibit A for the proposition that international trade agreements are incomplete contracts. According to the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements, it underpins the success of the GATT/WTO's shallow integration approach. Yet the observed role of the non-violation complaint is minimal. We develop a model of non-violation claims in trade agreements, demonstrate that it predicts a minimal on-equilibrium-path role for non-violation claims under reasonable pa...
-
作者：Li, Jin; Matouschek, Niko; Powell, Michael
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We examine an infinitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is earned, lost, and retained. It shows that entrenched power structures are consistent with optimal administration of power. And it provides new perspectives on why similar firms organize differently, even when those organizational differences lead to...
-
作者：Immorlica, Nicole; Kranton, Rachel; Manea, Mihai; Stoddard, Greg
作者单位：Microsoft; Duke University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University
摘要：We study social comparisons and status seeking in an interconnected society. Individuals take costly actions that have direct benefits and also confer social status. A new measure of interconnectedness-cohesion-captures the intensity of incentives for seeking status. Equilibria stratify players into social classes, with each class's action pinned down by cohesion. A network decomposition algorithm characterizes the highest (and most inefficient) equilibrium. Members of the largest maximally co...
-
作者：Belloc, Marianna; Bowles, Samuel
作者单位：Sapienza University Rome; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：Differences among nations in culture (preferences including social norms) and institutions (contracts) may result in specialization and gains from trade even in the absence of exogenous differences in factor endowments or technologies. Goods differ in the kinds of contracts that are appropriate for their production, and so strategic complementarities between contracts and social norms may result in a multiplicity of cultural-institutional equilibria. The resulting country differences in cultur...
-
作者：Pablo Arribillaga, R.; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the -set-inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation to be as manipulabl...
-
作者：Fleckinger, Pierre; Glachant, Matthieu; Moineville, Gabrielle
作者单位：Universite PSL; MINES ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Paris School of Economics
摘要：We develop a model of costly quality provision under biased disclosure. We define as friendly an environment in which the disclosure probability increases with quality, and as hostile an environment in which the opposite holds. Hostile environments produce a positive externality among sellers and potentially multiple equilibria. In contrast, friendly environments always yield a unique equilibrium. We establish that the environment that maximizes quality generates signals contradicting buyers' ...
-
作者：Kinateder, Markus; Merlino, Luca Paolo
作者单位：University of Navarra; University of Antwerp
摘要：We study a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous players. The source of heterogeneity affects the gains from a connection and hence equilibrium networks. When players differ in the cost of producing the public good, active players form pyramidal complete multipartite graphs; yet, better types need not have more neighbors. When players differ in the valuation of the public good, nested split graphs emerge in which production need not be monotonic in type. In large s...
