Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Che, Xiaogang; Klumpp, Tilman
• 署名单位: Durham University; University of Alberta
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140137
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 168-201
• 关键词: internet auctions; collusion; ebay; equilibria; insights; MARKETS; DESIGN; rules

摘要

We examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entry. We show that delayed revelation equilibria exist in which some buyers place coordinated low early bids. These buyers revise their bids to reflect their true valuations just prior to the end of the auction. Compared to the benchmark immediate revelation equilibrium, in which buyers bid their valuations immediately after entry, fewer high-value bidders enter on expectation in the delayed revelation equilibria. Delayed revelation of buyer values decreases social welfare, but is necessary for bidders to have a strict participation incentive.