Separating Bayesian Updating from Non-Probabilistic Reasoning: An Experimental Investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levin, Dan; Peck, James; Ivanov, Asen
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140008
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 39-60
• 关键词: common-value auctions; winners curse; players models; private values; games; INFORMATION; equilibrium; thinking; rules

摘要

Through a series of decision tasks involving colored cards, we provide separate measures of Bayesian updating and non-probabilistic reasoning skills. We apply these measures to (and are the first to study) a common-value Dutch auction. This format is more salient than the strategically equivalent first-price auction and silent Dutch formats in hinting that one should condition one's estimate of the value on having the highest bid. Both Bayesian updating skills and non-probabilistic reasoning skills are shown to help subjects correct for the winner's curse, as does the saliency of the active-clock Dutch format.