Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Conley, Timothy G.; Decarolis, Francesco
• 署名单位: Western University (University of Western Ontario); Boston University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130254
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1-38
• 关键词: procurement; COMPETITION

摘要

We study entry and bidding in procurement auctions where contracts are awarded to the bid closest to a trimmed average bid. These auctions, common in public procurement, create incentives to coordinate bids to manipulate the bid distribution. We present statistical tests to detect coordinated entry and bidding choices. The tests perform well in a validation dataset where a court case makes coordination observable. We use the tests to detect coordination in a larger dataset where it is suspected, but not known. The results are used to interpret a major market shakeout following a switch to first price auctions.