Just Enough or All: Selling a Firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ekmekci, Mehmet; Kos, Nenad; Vohra, Rakesh
• 署名单位: Boston College; Bocconi University; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140143
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 223-256
• 关键词: Mechanism design; contingent payments; private benefits; corporate-control; takeover bids; exchange; auctions; OWNERSHIP; acquisitions; SHAREHOLDERS

摘要

We consider the problem of selling a firm to a single buyer. The buyer privately knows post-sale cash flows and the benefits of control. Unlike the case where buyer's private information is one-dimensional, the optimal mechanism is a menu of tuples of cash-equity mixtures. When the seller wants to screen finely with respect to the private benefits, he makes an offer for the smallest fraction of the company that facilitates the transfer of control. When he wants to screen finely with respect to cash flows, he makes an offer for all the shares of the company.