Centralized Decision Making and Informed Lobbying

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lima, Rafael Costa; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry
• 署名单位: Universidade Federal de Pernambuco; Getulio Vargas Foundation; Paris School of Economics; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150253
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 324-355
• 关键词: free-trade agreements; political-economy approach; asymmetric information; FEDERALISM; PROTECTION; provision

摘要

We address the trade- off between centralized and decentralized decision making subject to influence from privately informed lobbies. We focus on informative equilibria with separating differentiable contribution schedules and identify an information transmission effect under centralized structures. Such effect decreases capture and increases welfare when lobbies have aligned preferences. The opposite effect holds for polarized preferences. We present two examples of this framework: local public goods and customs union agreements. Finally, we compare the policy outcomes from this political economy perspective to those under a normative mechanism design approach, and extend our analysis to the discussion of pooling equilibria.