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作者：Kartal, Melis
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：New relationships are often plagued with uncertainty because one of the players has some private information about her type. The reputation literature has shown that equilibria that reveal this private information typically involve breach of trust and conflict. But are these inevitable for equilibrium learning? I analyze self-enforcing relationships where one party is privately informed about her time preferences. I show that there always exist honest reputation equilibria, which fully reveal ...
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作者：Levy, Nadav; Spiegel, Yossi; Gilo, David
作者单位：Reichman University; Tel Aviv University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study the incentive to acquire a partial stake in a vertically related firm and then foreclose rivals. We show that whether such partial acquisitions are profitable depends crucially on the initial ownership structure of the target firm and on corporate governance.
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Varas, Felipe
作者单位：Stanford University; Duke University
摘要：We study firm's incentives to build and Maintain reputation-for quality, when quality is persistent and can be certified cost. We characterize all reputation-dependent MPEs. They vary in frequency of certification and payoffs. Low payoffs arise in equilibria because of over-certification traps. We contrast the MPEs with. the highest payoff equilibria. Industry certification standards can help firms coordinate on such good equilibria. The optimal equilibria allow firms to maintain high quality ...
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作者：Zudenkova, Galina
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper analyzes a multidistrict game of electoral accountability in which constituencies compete over scarce resources by setting expectations for targeted spending. I build a political agency model in which a vote-maximizing politician is subject to the oversight of distinct constituencies. The voters' demand for targeted spending in these constituencies is driven down by the competition among them. In order to make their constituency an attractive choice for discretionary spending, the v...
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作者：Quint, Daniel; Hendricks, Kenneth
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：When selling a business by auction, sellers typically use indicative bids nonbinding preliminary bids to select a small number of bidders to conduct due diligence and submit binding offers. We show that if entry into the auction is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly increasing strategies, with bidders pooling over a finite number of bids. The equilibrium helps the seller select high value bidders with higher likelihood, although the highest value...
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作者：Shahdadi, Behrang Kamali
作者单位：Sharif University of Technology
摘要：We model the problem of assigning counsel to poor defendants as a matching problem. A novel aspect of this matching problem is the moral hazard component on the part of counsel. Within the model, we show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate defendants' and attorneys' preferences, i.e., switch from random matching to stable matching, defendants become worse off because a stable matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on th...
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作者：Bertoletti, Paolo; Etro, Federico; Simonovska, Ina
作者单位：University of Pavia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We develop a general equilibrium model of trade that features indirectly additive preferences and heterogeneous firms. Monopolistic competition generates markups that are increasing in firm productivity and in destination country per capita income, but independent from destination population, as documented empirically. The gains from trade liberalization are lower than in models hosed on CES preferences, and the difference is governed by the average pass-through. When we calibrate the model so...
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作者：Igami, Mitsuru
摘要：This paper uncovers a novel pattern of offshoring dynamics in a high-tech industry, and proposes a structural model to explain it. Specifically, the hard disk drive industry (1976-1998) witnessed massive waves of entry, exit, and the relocation of manufacturing plants to low-cost countries, in which shakeouts occurred predominantly among home firms and almost all survivors were offshore firms. I build and estimate a dynamic offshoring game with entry/exit to measure the benefits and costs of o...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Hayashi, Takashi
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Glasgow
摘要：Karni and Viero (2013) present an interesting theory of decisions in the presence of new actions and consequences. We establish results on the observable implications of the model. When introducing new consequences, arbitrary preference reversals over feasible actions are permitted. This occurs even if an outside observer can uniquely pin down the decision maker's ordinal ranking over consequences.
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作者：Fehrler, Sebastian; Hughes, Niall
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of London; King's College London
摘要：We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate, and vote. We study three-levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently and test the model's key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model's predictions are largely borne out-transparency negatively affects informat...
