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作者：Galavotti, Stefano; Moretti, Luigi; Valbonesi, Paola
作者单位：University of Padua; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We study bidding behavior by firms in beauty-contest auctions, i.e., auctions in which the winning bid is the one that gets closest to some function (average) of all submitted bids. Using a dataset on public procurement beauty-contest auctions, we show that firms' observed bidding behavior departs from equilibrium and can be predicted by a sophistication index, which captures the firms' capacity of bidding close to optimality in the past. We show that our empirical evidence is consistent with ...
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作者：Krasnokutskaya, Elena; Terwiesch, Christian; Tiererova, Lucia
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We invoke the insights from the auction literature to study trade in services using data from an online market for programming support. We find that the observed clustering of trade between countries can be rationalized through a model featuring endogenous sorting of sellers who are heterogeneous in both quality and costs across projects offered by buyers who differ in outside option and willingness to pay for quality. To accommodate the possibility of such an outcome we extend a single-auctio...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Horner, Johannes
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with independent private and persistent values. We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the minimal disclosure regime, each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium, the allocation is efficient, and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings wher...
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作者：Drexl, Moritz; Kleiner, Andreas
作者单位：University of Bonn; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：A committee decides collectively whether to accept a given proposal or to maintain the status quo. Committee members are privately informed about their valuations and monetary transfers are possible. According to which rule should the committee make its decision? We consider strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms and solve for the decision rule that maximizes utilitarian welfare, which takes monetary transfers to an external agency explicitly into account. For regular distributions of prefere...
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作者：Sandroni, Alvaro; Urgun, Can
作者单位：Northwestern University; Princeton University
摘要：This paper examines the effects of patience on ordinary conflicts such as divorce, price wars, and commercial litigation. Players optimally decide when, if ever, to start a destructive confrontation. In the unique equilibrium, there is a tight connection between patience, aggressiveness, and strength. In particular, patience may lead to immediate confrontation (the most inefficient outcome). This inefficiency is caused by preemptive moves that deny option values to the opponent.
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作者：Samphantharak, Krislert; Townsend, Robert M.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper provides a theory-based empirical framework for understanding the risk and return on productive capital assets and their allocation across activities in an economy characterized by idiosyncratic and aggregate risk and thin formal markets for real and financial assets. We apply our framework to households running business enterprises in Thai villages with extensive networks, taking advantage of panel data: income, assets, consumption, gifts, and loans. We decompose risk and estimate ...
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作者：Bleichrodt, Han; Filko, Martin; Kothiyal, Amit; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Max Planck Society
摘要：Case-based decision theory (CBDT) provided a new way of revealing preferences, with decisions under uncertainty determined by similarities with cases in memory. This paper introduces a method to measure CBDT that requires no commitment to parametric families and that relates directly to decisions. Thus, CBDT becomes directly observable and can be used in prescriptive applications. Two experiments on real estate investments demonstrate the feasibility of our method. Our implementation of real i...
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作者：Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel
作者单位：European University Institute; University of Oslo
摘要：This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm-a mode of behavior followed by many-exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be m...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In this paper we analyze the coevolution of segregation into private and state schools, beliefs about the educational merits of different schools, and labor market discrimination. In a dynamic model, we characterize a necessary and sufficient condition on initial levels of segregation and beliefs under which full polarization of beliefs and long-run labor market discrimination are sustainable. The model suggests a new perspective on the long-term effects of different policy interventions, such...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Cantala, David
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Colegio de Mexico
摘要：We analyze the dynamic assignment of objects to agents organized in a constant size waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing and organs for transplants. We analyze the optimal design of probabilistic queuing disciplines, punishment schemes, and information release. With private values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to the lottery, but waste is lower at the lottery. With common values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to any other mechanism, and w...
