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作者：Lipnowski, Elliot; Mathevet, Laurent
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：We study how a benevolent expert should disclose information to an agent with psychological concerns. We first provide a method to compute an optimal information policy for many psychological traits. The method suggests, for instance, that an agent suffering from temptation a la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) should not know what he is missing, thereby explaining observed biases as an optimal reaction to costly self-control. We also show that simply recommending actions is optimal when the agent i...
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作者：Zhu, John Y.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In many jobs, the worker generates only subjective performance measures privately observed by the employer, and contracts must rely on employer reports about these measures. This setting is a game with private monitoring, and prior work suggests that the optimal contract may be complex and non-recursive. I introduce a novel equilibrium refinement and show that the optimal contract simplifies to an efficiency wage contract: The worker receives a wage above his outside option and reports take a ...
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作者：Harbaugh, Rick; Rasmusen, Eric
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Certifiers of quality often report only coarse grades to the public despite having measured quality more finely, e.g., Pass or Certified instead of 73 out of 100. Why? We show that coarse grades result in more information being provided to the public because the coarseness encourages those of middling quality to apply for certification. Dropping exact grading in favor of the best coarse grading scheme reduces public uncertainty because the extra participation outweighs the coarser reporting. I...
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作者：Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard; Sarpca, Sinan
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Koc University
摘要：A model of majority choice of voucher characteristics with quantitative counterpart explains observed income eligibility requirements for educational vouchers. Households differ by income and preference for religious schooling. They elect a policy maker who chooses public school expenditure, a voucher, a maximum income for voucher eligibility, and a tax to finance public expenditure. Equilibrium has a voucher below per student public expenditure, an eligibility threshold near 300 percent of th...
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作者：Andreoni, James
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The fear of moral hazard-especially in the age of internet commerce-can depress or prevent profitable trades. Experiments show, however, that many people prefer honesty to deceit and would not succumb to moral hazard. This paper asks whether we can find a simple, voluntary institution that can empower moral traders, drive out amoral ones, reduce moral hazard, and restore profitable trade to markets. I find that selling goods with a satisfaction guarantee, accompanied by potentially minor legal...
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作者：Chen, Ying-Ju; Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Monash University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider a network model where individuals exert efforts in two types of activities that are interdependent. These activities can be either substitutes or complements. We provide a full characterization of the Nash equilibrium of this game for any network structure. We show, in particular, that quadratic games with linear best-reply functions aggregate nicely to multiple activities because equilibrium efforts obey similar formulas to that of the one-activity case. We then derive some compar...
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作者：Chandra, Ambarish; Lederman, Mara
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We revisit the relationship between competition and price discrimination. Theoretically, we show that if consumers differ in terms of both their underlying willingness-to-pay and their brand loyalty, competition may increase price differences between some consumers while decreasing them between others. Empirically, we find that competition has little impact at the top or the bottom of the price distribution but a significant impact in the middle, thus increasing some price differentials but de...
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作者：He, Yinghua; Miralles, Antonio; Pycia, Marek; Yan, Jianye
作者单位：Rice University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Zurich; Peking University; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on ...
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作者：Cosaert, Sam
作者单位：KU Leuven
摘要：When consumers care not only for the quantity but also the value of a product, it could he rational to purchase products as they become more expensive. This study provides nonparametric revealed preference-conditions to measure consumers' marginal willingness to pay for value (i.e., diamondness) associated with particular goods. This is the first nonparametric test of price-dependent preferences. The proposed diamondness measure is applied to observational data from the Russia Longitudinal Mon...
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作者：Kawai, Kehchi; Lang, Ruitian; Li, Hongyi
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper explores the origins of policy complexity. It studies a model where policy is difficult to undo because policy elements are entangled with each other. Policy complexity may accumulate as successive policymakers layer new' rules upon existing policy. Complexity emerges and persists in balanced democratic polities, when policymakers are ideologically extreme, and when legislative frictions impede policymaking. Complexity begets complexity: simple policies remain simple, whereas comple...
