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作者：Chen, Cheng
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：I incorporate a monitoring-based firm hierarchy into an industry equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. I then use the theory to study aggregate impacts of an economy-wide improvement in monitoring efficiency. This shock generates a selection effect, which favors more hierarchical (i.e., more layers) firms. Interestingly, these implications depend on firms' heterogeneous choices about their hierarchy and completely disappear when firms are homogeneous in terms of the number of layers insi...
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作者：Plott, Charles R.; Pogorelskiy, Kirill
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Warwick
摘要：We study multiple-unit, laboratory experimental call markets in which orders are cleared by a single price at a scheduled call. The markets are independent trading days with two calls each day preceded by a continuous and public order flow. Markets approach the competitive equilibrium over time. The price formation dynamics operate through the flow of bids and asks configured as the jaws of the order book with contract execution featuring elements of an underlying mathematical principle, the N...
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作者：Gautier, Pieter A.; Holzner, Christian L.
作者单位：Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We consider a model where firms open vacancies and post and commit to a wage mechanism. Search is costly and workers simultaneously apply to multiple jobs. Firms can be connected to multiple workers and workers to multiple firms. We use a new method to derive the expected maximum number of matches in a large market as a function of the number of applications and market tightness. We also derive the conditions under which firm entry, worker participation, and search intensity are socially effic...
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作者：Ahlin, Christian
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：We study one-sided matching when groups with n > 2 members are being formed. Type-complementarity rules out all but the rank-ordered grouping. Type-substitutability (for example, matching to share risk) rules out much less. It requires that every two groups must be intertwined, in that each dominates the other at some rank. Intertwined matching is necessary and, in one context, sufficient for any grouping to be a potential equilibrium. But there are many intertwined matching patterns when n > ...
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作者：Krishna, Kala; Sheveleva, Yelena
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cardiff University
摘要：Why do developing countries fail to specialize in products in which they appear to have a comparative advantage? We propose a model of agricultural trade with intermediation that explains how hold up resulting from poor contracting environments can produce such an outcome. We use the model to explore the role of production subsidies, support prices, easing sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements, and the creation of local markets in resolving the hold up problem. The model highlights the...
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作者：Lizzeri, Alessandro; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：New York University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：Behavioral economics presents a paternalistic rationale for a benevolent government's intervention. We consider an economy where the only distortion is agents' time-inconsistency. We study the desirability of various forms of collective action, ones pertaining to costly commitment and ones pertaining to the timing of consumption, when government decisions respond to voters' preferences via the political process. Three messages emerge. First, welfare is highest under either full centralization ...
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作者：Burguet, Roberto
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：I investigate the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After contracting with the sponsor, the contractor may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. The mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I discuss the cases of both fixed and variable (with the size of misrepresentation) bribes, and also uncertainty about the bribe amount. In all cases, the optimal contract curtails quality for low efficiency contractors but also for the most efficient contractor...
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作者：Xefteris, Dimitrios; Ziros, Nicholas
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：This paper studies decentralized vote trading in a power sharing system that follows the rules of strategic market games. In particular, we study a two-party election in which prior to the voting stage, voters are free to trade votes for money. Voters hold private information about both their ordinal and cardinal preferences, whereas their utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party. In this framework, we prove generic existence of a unique full trade equi...
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作者：Baranov, Oleg; Aperjis, Christina; Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; North Carolina State University
摘要：For procuring from sellers with decreasing returns, there are known efficient dynamic auction formats. In this paper, we design an efficient dynamic procurement auction for the case where goods are homogeneous and bidders have increasing returns. Our motivating example is the procurement of vaccines, which often exhibit large fixed costs and small constant marginal costs. The auctioneer names a price and bidders report the interval of quantities that they are willing to sell at that price. The...
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作者：McMurray, Joseph
作者单位：Brigham Young University
摘要：Spatial election literature attributes voters' political differences to irreconcilable conflicts of interest. Alternatively, voters may merely hold differing beliefs regarding which policies best promote the public interest, as in the classic common-value model of Condorcet (1785). This paper shows how a spatial version of the common-value model explains empirical patterns of public opinion, ideology, electoral margins, and participation that are puzzling from the standard perspective, suggest...
