How Important Can the Non-Violation Clause Be for the GATT/WTO?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Staiger, Robert W.; Sykes, Alan O.
• 署名单位: Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150139
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 149-187
• 关键词: world-trade-organization; DISPUTE SETTLEMENT; INTERNATIONAL-TRADE; domestic policies; AGREEMENTS; WTO; RENEGOTIATION; SYSTEM

摘要

The non-violation clause of GATT is Exhibit A for the proposition that international trade agreements are incomplete contracts. According to the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements, it underpins the success of the GATT/WTO's shallow integration approach. Yet the observed role of the non-violation complaint is minimal. We develop a model of non-violation claims in trade agreements, demonstrate that it predicts a minimal on-equilibrium-path role for non-violation claims under reasonable parameter restrictions, and show that the non-violation clause may nevertheless play an important off-equilibrium-path role in the GATT/WTO.