Dynamic Agenda Setting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya
• 署名单位: Johns Hopkins University; Rice University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150298
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1-32
• 关键词: electoral competition; resource-allocation; issue ownership; status-quo; SALIENCE; Deficit; POLICY; media

摘要

A party in power can address a limited number of issues. What issues to address-the party's agenda-has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent addresses one issue among many and the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We show that no strategic manipulation arises without checks and balances and identify strategic manipulations in the forms of waiting for the moment, seizing the moment, steering, and preemption with checks and balances depending on how power fluctuates. We also discuss efficiency implications.