Should First-Price Auctions Be Transparent?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bergemann, Dirk; Horner, Johannes
署名单位：
Yale University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20160278
发表日期：
2018
页码：
177-218
关键词：
摘要：
We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with independent private and persistent values. We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the minimal disclosure regime, each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium, the allocation is efficient, and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings where either all or only the winner's bids are public, an inefficient pooling equilibrium with low revenues exists.
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