When to Confront: The Role of Patience

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sandroni, Alvaro; Urgun, Can
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150309
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 219-252
• 关键词: stopping games; WAR

摘要

This paper examines the effects of patience on ordinary conflicts such as divorce, price wars, and commercial litigation. Players optimally decide when, if ever, to start a destructive confrontation. In the unique equilibrium, there is a tight connection between patience, aggressiveness, and strength. In particular, patience may lead to immediate confrontation (the most inefficient outcome). This inefficiency is caused by preemptive moves that deny option values to the opponent.