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作者：Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University
摘要：Should a buyer approach sellers of complementary goods informed or uninformed of her private valuations, and if informed, in which sequence? In this paper, we show that an informed buyer would start with the high-value seller to minimize future holdup. Informed (or careful) sequencing may, however, hurt the buyer as sellers read into it. The buyer may, therefore, commit to ignorance, perhaps, by overloading herself with unrelated tasks, delegating the sequencing decision, or letting sellers se...
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作者：Andonie, Costel; Diermeier, Daniel
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago; University of Chicago; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
摘要：We propose a model of impressionable voters. Impressionable voters vote based on impressions rather than maximizing expected utility. We apply our model to elections with multiple candidates and solve for the stationary distributions of the implied stochastic process. In elections with two candidates, we find that impressionable voters select the candidate that maximizes utilitarian welfare. In multi candidate elections, Condorcet winners are elected provided that a majority of voters is able ...
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作者：Hurkens, Sjaak; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Florence
摘要：We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) both firms' profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling increases the dominant firm's market share substantially, thereby raising its profit while reducing its rival's profit. Hence, the threat to bundle is then a c...
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作者：Khalmetski, Kiryl; Sliwka, Dirk
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies, while the effect of the fixed ...
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作者：Chen, Zhijun; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：Monash University; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper compares exclusive dealing and market share contracts in a model of naked exclusion. We discuss how the contracts work and identify a fundamental trade-off that arises: market share contracts are better at maximizing a seller's benefit from foreclosure (because they allow the seller to obtain any foreclosure level it desires), whereas exclusive-dealing contracts are better at minimizing a seller's cost of foreclosure (because, unlike with market share contracts, the seller does not ...
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作者：Reimers, Imke
作者单位：Northeastern University
摘要：Taking works off copyright promotes their availability, but it also allows generic entry to dissipate producer surplus. This paper examines the effect of a copyright on the availability and price of books when incentives to create new works are not affected. Evaluating the welfare impact of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act, I find that a copyright significantly limits the availability of works, leading to a decrease in consumer surplus, which is significantly larger than any increases in ...
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作者：Cai, Hongbin; Feng, Hong; Weng, Xi
作者单位：Peking University; Harbin Institute of Technology
摘要：We consider a three-member organization in which one member retires in each period and the incumbent members vote to admit a candidate to fill the vacancy. Candidates differ in quality center dot and belong to one of two types, and majority-type members share the total rent of that period. We characterize the symmetric Markov equilibria with undominated strategies and compare the long-term welfare among them. Unanimity voting is better than majority voting at promoting long-term welfare. In ad...
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作者：Dizdar, Deniz
作者单位：Universite de Montreal
摘要：Heterogeneous buyers and sellers must make investments before entering a continuum assignment market. I show that efficient ex post contracting equilibria (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001b) exist in a general assignment game framework. I then shed light on what enables and what precludes coordination failures. A simple condition-absence of technological multiplicity-guarantees efficient investments for each pair, but a mismatch of agents may still occur. However, using optimal transport th...
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作者：Cisternas, Ionlalo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I examine how career concerns are shaped by the nature of productive actions taken by workers. A worker's skills follow a Gaussian process with an endogenous component reflecting human-capital accumulation. Effort and skills are substitutes both in the output process (as in Holmstrom 1999) and in the skills technology. The focus is on deterministic equilibria by virtue of Gaussian learning. When effort and skills are direct inputs to production and skills are exogenous, effort can be inefficie...
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作者：Bederson, Benjamin B.; Jin, Ginger Zhe; Leslie, Phillip; Quinn, Alexander J.; Zou, Ben
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Michigan State University
摘要：In 2011, Maricopa County adopted voluntary restaurant hygiene grade cards (A, B, C, D). Using inspection results between 2007 and 2013, we show that only 58 percent of the subsequent inspections led to online grade posting. Although the disclosure rate in general declines with inspection outcome, higher-quality A restaurants are less likely to disclose than lower-quality As. After examining potential explanations, we believe the observed pattern is best explained by a mixture of signaling and ...
