Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Drexl, Moritz; Kleiner, Andreas
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160337
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 253-271
• 关键词: Public good provision; strategy-proof; mechanisms; allocation

摘要

A committee decides collectively whether to accept a given proposal or to maintain the status quo. Committee members are privately informed about their valuations and monetary transfers are possible. According to which rule should the committee make its decision? We consider strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms and solve for the decision rule that maximizes utilitarian welfare, which takes monetary transfers to an external agency explicitly into account. For regular distributions of preferences, we find that it is optimal to exclude monetary transfers and to decide by qualified majority voting. This sheds new light on the common objection that criticizes voting for its inefficiency.