From Peer Pressure to Biased Norms
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel
署名单位：
European University Institute; University of Oslo
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20150151
发表日期：
2017
页码：
152-216
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm-a mode of behavior followed by many-exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be more sustainable than a non-biased norm, which may explain the bias of various social and religious norms.
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