Partial Vertical Integration, Ownership Structure, and Foreclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levy, Nadav; Spiegel, Yossi; Gilo, David
• 署名单位: Reichman University; Tel Aviv University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160058
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 132-180
• 关键词: cable-television; MARKET; mergers; CONTRACTS; systems

摘要

We study the incentive to acquire a partial stake in a vertically related firm and then foreclose rivals. We show that whether such partial acquisitions are profitable depends crucially on the initial ownership structure of the target firm and on corporate governance.