How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fehrler, Sebastian; Hughes, Niall
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz; University of London; King's College London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160046
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 181-209
• 关键词: cheap-talk; rules; COMMUNICATION; transmission; committees; deception; audiences; publicity; experts; debate

摘要

We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate, and vote. We study three-levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently and test the model's key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model's predictions are largely borne out-transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts.