Electoral Accountability and Interdistrict Competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zudenkova, Galina
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150307
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 143-176
• 关键词: incumbency advantage; buying supermajorities; Special Interests; policy choices; pork-barrel; us-house; POLITICS; voters; allocation; ELECTIONS

摘要

This paper analyzes a multidistrict game of electoral accountability in which constituencies compete over scarce resources by setting expectations for targeted spending. I build a political agency model in which a vote-maximizing politician is subject to the oversight of distinct constituencies. The voters' demand for targeted spending in these constituencies is driven down by the competition among them. In order to make their constituency an attractive choice for discretionary spending, the voters adopt reelection standards below what they receive in equilibrium. They therefore tend to be satisfied with the distributive politics of the incumbent politician. The incumbent is then quite likely to win more than half of the votes.