Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marinovic, Ivan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Varas, Felipe
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Duke University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160282
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 58-82
• 关键词: disclosure; INFORMATION; games

摘要

We study firm's incentives to build and Maintain reputation-for quality, when quality is persistent and can be certified cost. We characterize all reputation-dependent MPEs. They vary in frequency of certification and payoffs. Low payoffs arise in equilibria because of over-certification traps. We contrast the MPEs with. the highest payoff equilibria. Industry certification standards can help firms coordinate on such good equilibria. The optimal equilibria allow firms to maintain high quality forever, once it is reached for the first time. They are either lenient or harsh, endowing firms with. multiple or one chance to improve and certify quality.