Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kartal, Melis
• 署名单位: Vienna University of Economics & Business
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160178
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 278-314
• 关键词: Relational contracts; reference points; disappointment aversion; strategic delay; starting small; moral hazard; unemployment; credibility; INFORMATION; MARKETS

摘要

New relationships are often plagued with uncertainty because one of the players has some private information about her type. The reputation literature has shown that equilibria that reveal this private information typically involve breach of trust and conflict. But are these inevitable for equilibrium learning? I analyze self-enforcing relationships where one party is privately informed about her time preferences. I show that there always exist honest reputation equilibria, which fully reveal information and support cooperation without breach or conflict. I compare these to dishonest reputation equilibria from several perspectives. My results are applicable to a broad class of repeated games.