False Positives and Transparency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Libgober, Jonathan
• 署名单位: University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190218
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 478-505
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; ECONOMICS

摘要

I develop a theoretical model of costly information acquisition in order to evaluate transparency requirements in empirical research. A sender chooses an experiment characterized by multiple dimensions, while a receiver observes the experiment's outcome (though not necessarily all dimensions). I show that the receiver may prefer to keep dimensions hidden, even those contributing to bias, despite preferring more informative experiments. This can occur if the perception of bias is lessened when the sender compensates along a dimension that is observed. I elucidate how complementarity between dimensions underlies this result.