Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kleiner, Andreas; Moldovanu, Benny
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200147
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 583-615
• 关键词: sincere

摘要

We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a left-right axis. Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be designed? We assume that preferences are single peaked on a tree and study convex agendas where, at each stage in the voting pro-cess, the tree of remaining alternatives is divided into two subtrees that are subjected to a Yes-No vote. We show that strategic voting coincides with sincere, unsophisticated voting. Based on inference results and revealed preference arguments, we illustrate the empiri-cal implications for two case studies.