Communication and Cooperation in Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ali, S. Nageeb; Miller, David A.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200296
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 200-217
• 关键词: Repeated games; social norms; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; folk theorem; reputation; RECIPROCITY; EVOLUTION; TRADE

摘要

Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incen-tive compatible. We find that if each side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives are satisfied only when the volume of trade is low. By contrast, if only one side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives do not constrain the volume of supportable trade. Accordingly, there are strong gains from structuring trade so that one side either moves first or has its cooperation guaranteed by external enforcement. (JEL D82, D83)