Stochastic Equilibria: Noise in Actions or Beliefs?†

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friedman, Evan
• 署名单位: University of Essex
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190013
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 94-142
• 关键词: games; BEHAVIOR; unique; CHOICE; matter; MODEL

摘要

We introduce noisy belief equilibrium (NBE) for normal-form games in which players best respond to noisy belief realizations. Axioms restrict belief distributions to be unbiased with respect to and responsive to changes in the opponents' behavior. The axioms impose testable restrictions both within and across games, and we compare these restrictions to those of regular quantal response equi-librium (QRE) in which axioms are placed on the quantal response function as the primitive. NBE can generate similar predictions as QRE in several classes of games. Unlike QRE, NBE is a refinement of rationalizability and invariant to affine transformations of payoffs. (JEL C72, D83, D91)