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作者：Lu, Jingfeng; Ye, Lixin; Feng, X. I. N.
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Nanjing University
摘要：We study how to orchestrate information acquisition in an environment where bidders endowed with original estimates (types ) about their private values can acquire further information by incurring a cost. We consider both single-round and fully sequential shortlisting rules. The optimal single-round shortlisting rule admits the set of most efficient bidders that maximizes expected virtual surplus adjusted by the second-stage signal and information acquisition cost. When shortlisting is fully s...
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作者：Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Park, In-Uck
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：We examine a setup where two agents allocate a fixed budget between public goods in two areas. The agents may be biased to one area, which is their private information. Without communication, the funds are allocated inefficiently, resulting in gaps and duplication in public good provision. Direct communication between the agents is ineffective and cannot resolve the coordination failure even when the potential biases are negligible. Coordination can be improved by a mediator who filters the in...
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作者：Tyson, Christopher J.
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We propose the exponential satisficing model of boundedly rational decision-making, a general-purpose tool designed for use in typical microeconomic applications. The model posits that the preferences perceived and acted upon by the agent are a stochastic coarsening of his or her true, welfare-significant preferences. The decision-maker's perceptual capabilities are controlled by a preference resolution parameter, which smoothly varies the impact of cognitive constraints on choice. To demonstr...
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作者：Millner, Antony; Heyen, Daniel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：Commentators often lament forecasters' inability to provide precise predictions of the long-run behavior of complex economic and physical systems. Yet their concerns often conflate the presence of substantial long-run uncertainty with the need for long-run predictability; short-run predictions can partially substitute for long-run predictions if decision-makers can adjust their activities over time. So what is the relative importance of short- and long-run predictability? We study this questio...
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作者：Bizzotto, Jacopo; Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect of the deadline and outside information creates incentives for the principal to keep uncertainty high in the first periods so as to persuade the agent close to the deadline. We characterize the equilibrium, compare it to the single-player decision problem in which exogenous o...
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作者：Shelegia, Sandro; Wilson, Chris M.
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Loughborough University
摘要：To better understand temporary price reductions or sales, this paper presents a generalized clearinghouse framework of advertised sales and explores some applications. By viewing the firms as competing in utility and amending the conventional tiebreak rule, we allow for multiple dimensions of firm heterogeneity in complex market environments. Moreover, we (i) provide original insights into the number and types of firms that use sales, (ii) offer new results on how firm heterogeneity affects ma...
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作者：Dessein, Wouter; Santos, Tano
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Is firm behavior mainly driven by its environment or rather by the characteristics of its managers? We develop a cognitive theory of manager fixed effects, where the allocation of managerial attention determines firm behavior. We show that in complex environments, the endogenous allocation of attention exacerbates manager fixed effects. Small differences in managerial expertise then may result in dramatically different firm behavior, as managers devote scarce attention in a way that amplifies ...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Siegenthaler, Simon
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：In markets with asymmetric information, where equilibria are often inefficient, bargaining can help promote welfare. We design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that competition promotes efficiency if bargainers cannot observe each other's price offers. Contrary to the predictions, however, the efficiency-enhancing effect of competition persists even when offers are observable. We exp...
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作者：Ryan, Nicholas
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：The integration of markets may improve efficiency by lowering costs or reducing local market power. India, seeking to reduce electricity shortages, set up a new power market, in which transmission constraints sharply limit trade between regions. During congested hours, measures of market competitiveness fall and firms raise bid prices. I use confidential bidding data to estimate the costs of power supply and simulate market outcomes with more transmission capacity. Counterfactual simulations s...
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作者：Maniquet, Francois; Neumann, Dirk
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In a model where agents differ in wages and preferences over labor time-consumption bundles, we study labor income tax schemes that alleviate poverty. To avoid conflict with individual well-being, we require redistribution to take place between agents on both sides of the poverty line provided they have the same labor time. This requirement is combined with efficiency and robustness properties. Maximizing the resulting social preferences under incentive compatibility constraints yields the fol...
