Learning in Relational Contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kostadinov, Rumen; Kuvalekar, Aditya
• 署名单位: McMaster University; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190203
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 284-329
• 关键词: Stochastic games; starting small; folk theorem; INFORMATION

摘要

We study relational contracts between a firm and a worker with mutual uncertainty about match quality. The worker's actions are publicly observed and generate both output and information about the match quality. We show that the relational contracts may be inefficient. We characterize the inefficiency through a holdup problem on the contemporaneous output. In the frequent action limit, these inefficiencies persist if and only if information degrades at least at the same rate at which impatience vanishes. We characterize optimal relational contracts and show that they involve actions that yield both a lower payoff and less information than another action.